Terrorism: Theory and applications

This chapter reviews game-theoretic and choice-theoretic depictions of terrorist behavior. A simple game-theoretic framework is presented to ascertain under what circumstances a government would want to precommit itself to a no-negotiation strategy. In another game model, we analyze whether two governments (nations) that are targeted by the same terrorist group would overdeter or underdeter terrorist attacks. Moreover, we demonstrate that piecemeal policy, which allows the governments to share intelligence but not deterrence decisions, can be worse than no coordination. Choice-theoretic models identify substitution and complementarity possibilities among diverse modes of terrorist attacks as terrorists respond optimally to government actions. A host of time-series techniques are used to study the effectiveness of alternative antiterrorism policies. Vector-autoregression intervention procedures are particularly suited. Time-series analyses are also used to identify cycles, trends, and irregular components for forecasting purposes.

[1]  Walter Enders,et al.  Causality between transnational terrorism and tourism: The case of Spain , 1991 .

[2]  M. Lichbach,et al.  Deterrence or Escalation? , 1987 .

[3]  Per Baltzer Overgaard,et al.  The Scale of Terrorist Attacks as a Signal of Resources , 1994 .

[4]  James D. Hamilton.  Time Series Analysis , 1994 .

[5]  Walter Enders,et al.  A time‐series analysis of transnational terrorism: Trends and cycles , 1992 .

[6]  Reinhard Selten.  Models Of Strategic Rationality , 1988 .

[7]  P. Nelson.  Terrorism and the media: An empirical analysis , 1992 .

[8]  Ken Binmore,et al.  Fun and games , 1991 .

[9]  Jon Cauley,et al.  Intervention Policy Analysis of Skyjackings and Other Terrorist Incidents , 1988 .

[10]  Todd Sandler,et al.  Collective Action: Theory and Applications , 1992 .

[11]  P. Wilkinson,et al.  Contemporary Research on Terrorism , 1989 .

[12]  Harvey E. Lapan,et al.  To Bargain or Not to Bargain: That is the Question , 1988 .

[13]  W. Enders.  Applied Econometric Time Series , 1994 .

[14]  W. Fuller,et al.  Distribution of the Estimators for Autoregressive Time Series with a Unit Root , 1979 .

[15]  Walter Enders,et al.  Assessing the impact of terrorist‐thwarting policies: An intervention time series approach , 1990 .

[16]  Todd Sandler,et al.  On the optimal retaliation against terrorists: The paid-rider option , 1989 .

[17]  L. Alexander.  Terrorism: Theory And Practice , 1979 .

[18]  Dwight R. Lee.  Free Riding and Paid Riding in the Fight against Terrorism , 1988 .

[19]  Edward F. Mickolus,et al.  Transnational Terrorism: A Chronology of Events, 1968-1979. The Literature of Terrorism: A Selectively Annotated Bibliography , 1981 .

[20]  T. Sandler,et al.  A Theoretical Analysis of Transnational Terrorism , 1983, American Political Science Review.

[21]  Walter Enders,et al.  An Econometric Analysis of the Impact of Terrorism on Tourism , 1992 .

[22]  Martha Crenshaw,et al.  Current research on terrorism: The academic perspective , 1992 .

[23]  John A. C. Conybeare,et al.  Retaliating against Terrorism: Rational Expectations and the Optimality of Rules versus Discretion , 1994 .

[24]  Harvey E. Lapan,et al.  Terrorism and signalling , 1993 .

[25]  Economic Methodology Applied to Political Hostage-Taking in Light of the Iran-Contra Affair , 1989 .

[26]  Walter Enders,et al.  UN Conventions, Technology and Retaliation in the Fight Against Terrorism: An Econometric Evaluation , 1990 .

[27]  W. Fuller,et al.  LIKELIHOOD RATIO STATISTICS FOR AUTOREGRESSIVE TIME SERIES WITH A UNIT ROOT , 1981 .

[28]  P. Perron,et al.  The Great Crash, The Oil Price Shock And The Unit Root Hypothesis , 1989 .

[29]  William M. Landes,et al.  An Economic Study of U. S. Aircraft Hijacking, 1961-1976 , 1978, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[30]  Muhammad Q. Islam,et al.  Combating political hostage‐taking: An alternative approach , 1992 .

[31]  J. L. Scott,et al.  Reputation building in hostage taking incidents , 1991 .

[32]  Scott E. Atkinson,et al.  Terrorism in a Bargaining Framework , 1987, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[33]  Walter Enders,et al.  The Effectiveness of Antiterrorism Policies: A Vector-Autoregression-Intervention Analysis , 1993, American Political Science Review.