Nash equilibria of n-player repeated games with semi-standard information

The folk theorem is extended here to the case where after each stage of the repeated game each player is informed only about the equivalence classes of the pure actions which were used by the other players. The sets of upper equilibrium payoffs and of lower equilibrium payoffs are characterized here, and they are found to be different.

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