Truth, Effort, and the Legal Battle

In lawsuits, relative success depends upon two main factors:the true degree of fault, and the efforts invested on eachside. A proposed Litigation Success Function displays thisdependence while satisfying other essential properties. Undertwo different protocols, Nash-Cournot and Stackelberg,solutions are obtained for the litigation efforts,proportionate success, and values of the lawsuit on each side.Outcomes are evaluated in terms of two normative criteria; (i)achieving `justice' (interpreted as equality between Defendantfault and relative Plaintiff success) and (ii) minimizingaggregate litigation cost. Achievement of these aims isdetermined by the decisiveness of litigation effort relativeto true fault.

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