An analytical framework for the Prisoner’s Dilemma: Finite state machine representation for interactions between deterministic strategies

Abstract An analytical framework for the Prisoner’s Dilemma is introduced. A finite state machine is used to represent interactions between two deterministic strategies, and two criteria – the ability to exploit others and the ability to form clone clusters – are used to identify the relationships between those strategies. The framework is then used to analyze the properties of memory-l deterministic strategies. The results show a significant understanding of strategy sets. All initial conditions are taken into account, and the result is independent of the value of the payoff matrix. The framework is also capable of analyzing strategies that are encoded in other forms, such as finite automata or rule sets.

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