Cooperation and Competition in Climate Change Policies: Mitigation and Climate Engineering when Countries are Asymmetric

We study a dynamic game of climate policy design in terms of emissions and solar radiation management (SRM) involving two heterogeneous countries or group of countries. Countries emit greenhouse gasses (GHGs), and can block incoming radiation by unilateral SRM activities, thus reducing global temperature. Heterogeneity is modelled in terms of the social cost of SRM, the environmental damages due to global warming, the productivity of emissions in terms of generating private benefits, the rate of impatience, and the private cost of geoengineering. We determine the impact of asymmetry on mitigation and SRM activities, concentration of GHGs, and global temperature, and we examine whether a tradeoff actually emerges between mitigation and SRM. Our results could provide some insights into a currently emerging debate regarding mitigation and SRM methods to control climate change, especially since asymmetries seem to play an important role in affecting incentives for cooperation or unilateral actions.

[1]  Gareth Davies,et al.  Geoengineering the Climate: Science, Governance and Uncertainty , 2010 .

[2]  Georges Zaccour,et al.  Dynamic Games in the Economics and Management of Pollution , 2009 .

[3]  T. Başar,et al.  Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory , 1982 .

[4]  David W. Keith,et al.  Climate policy under uncertainty: a case for solar geoengineering , 2013, Climatic Change.

[5]  I. C. Prentice,et al.  Climatic Control of the High-Latitude Vegetation Greening Trend and Pinatubo Effect , 2002, Science.

[6]  Adam Millard-Ball,et al.  The Tuvalu Syndrome , 2012, Climatic Change.

[7]  T. Delworth,et al.  Probing the Fast and Slow Components of Global Warming by Returning Abruptly to Preindustrial Forcing , 2010 .

[8]  David William Keith,et al.  Cost analysis of stratospheric albedo modification delivery systems , 2012 .

[9]  J. Coakley,et al.  Testing Energy Balance Climate Models , 1979 .

[10]  A. Robock.  Volcanic eruptions and climate , 2000 .

[11]  Tamer Basar,et al.  Time Consistency and Robustness of Equilibria in Non-Cooperative Dynamic Games , 1989 .

[12]  Timothy M. Lenton,et al.  Climate engineering reconsidered , 2014 .

[13]  T. Başar,et al.  Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory, 2nd Edition , 1998 .

[14]  Variational Formulation of Budyko-Sellers Climate Models , 1979 .

[15]  Anastasios Xepapadeas,et al.  Pollution Control with Uncertain Stock Dynamics: When, and How, to be Precautious , 2012 .

[16]  G. North.  Analytical Solution to a Simple Climate Model with Diffusive Heat Transport. , 1975 .

[17]  James M. Russell,et al.  Ozone and temperature changes in the stratosphere following the eruption of Mount Pinatubo , 1995 .

[18]  P. Crutzen.  Albedo Enhancement by Stratospheric Sulfur Injections: A Contribution to Resolve a Policy Dilemma? , 2006 .

[19]  W. Brock,et al.  Energy balance climate models and general equilibrium optimal mitigation policies , 2013 .

[20]  G. North.  Theory of Energy-Balance Climate Models. , 1975 .

[21]  J. Coakley.  A Study of Climate Sensitivity Using a Simple Energy Balance Model , 1979 .

[22]  Juan Moreno-Cruz,et al.  Mitigation and the Geoengineering Threat , 2015 .

[23]  Ben Kravitz,et al.  Benefits, risks, and costs of stratospheric geoengineering , 2009 .

[24]  S. Barrett.  The Incredible Economics of Geoengineering , 2008 .

[25]  T. Lenton,et al.  The radiative forcing potential of different climate geoengineering options , 2009 .

[26]  J. List,et al.  Optimal Institutional Arrangements for Transboundary Pollutants in a Second-Best World: Evidence from a Differential Game with Asymmetric Players , 2000 .

[27]  W. Brock,et al.  Spatial Climate-Economic Models in the Design of Optimal Climate Policies Across Locations , 2012 .

[28]  Martin L. Weitzman,et al.  What is the 'Damages Function' for Global Warming - and What Difference Might it Make? , 2010 .

[29]  M. Tavoni,et al.  Geoengineering and Abatement: A 'Flat' Relationship Under Uncertainty , 2013 .

[30]  K. Taylor,et al.  The Geoengineering Model Intercomparison Project (GeoMIP) , 2011 .

[31]  Shingo Watanabe,et al.  The impact of abrupt suspension of solar radiation management (termination effect) in experiment G2 of the Geoengineering Model Intercomparison Project (GeoMIP) , 2013 .

[32]  Alan Robock,et al.  20 reasons why geoengineering may be a bad idea , 2008 .

[33]  A. Xepapadeas,et al.  Mitigation and Solar Radiation Management in Climate Change Policies , 2013 .

[34]  B. Santer,et al.  Effect of climate sensitivity on the Response to Volcanic Forcing , 2005 .

[35]  E. Dockner,et al.  International Pollution Control: Cooperative versus Noncooperative Strategies , 1993 .

[36]  David William Keith.  Geoengineering the Climate: History and Prospect 1 , 2000, The Ethics of Nanotechnology, Geoengineering and Clean Energy.