论文信息 - A Note on Multi-Issue Two-Sided Bargaining: Bilateral Procedures

A Note on Multi-Issue Two-Sided Bargaining: Bilateral Procedures

This note considers a two-sided multi-issue bargaining problem in which players that belong to the same "side" may have conflicting priorities regarding the different negotiated issues. The note examines different bilateral bargaining procedures and shows the different equilibrium settlement that they yield. In particular the note examines the posiibility that group heterogeneity (conflicting priorities) may be exploited in order to gain a better settlement.

Chaim Fershtman | Chaim Fershtman

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