论文信息 - A cooperative game of information trading: The core, the nucleolus and the kernel

A cooperative game of information trading: The core, the nucleolus and the kernel

A certain trade of the information about a technological innovation between the initial owner of the information andn identical producers is studied by means of a cooperative game theoretic approach. The information trading situation is modelled as a cooperative (n+1)-person game with side payments. The symmetrical strong ɛ-cores (including the core), the nucleolus and the kernel of the cooperative game model are determined. Interpretations of these game theoretic solutions and their implications for the information trading problem are given.

Shigeo Muto | Theo S. H. Driessen | Mikio Nakayama

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