A theoretical look at firm performance in high-tech organizations: what does existing theory tell us?

Abstract This paper looks at the changing nature of work for workers in knowledge-intensive high-tech firms. Four theories (institutional theory [IT], resource-based theory, game theory, and agency theory) are examined and propositions formulated as to how each theory helps explain the existence of intellectual cooperation and knowledge sharing within high-tech firms. The paper examines the usefulness of existing theory and suggests new research propositions, constructs, and methods to focus on building an empirical approach towards organizational research in the high-tech arena.

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