Invariance to representation of information

Under weak assumptions on the solution concept, I construct an invariant selection across all finite type spaces, in which the types with identical information play the same action. Along the way, I establish an interesting lattice structure for finite type spaces and construct an equilibrium on the space of all finite types.

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