D. Levine

发表

The Theory of Learning in Games

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, 1998 .

Self-confirming equilibrium

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, 1993 .

A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, 2004, The American economic review.

Steady state learning and Nash equilibrium

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, 1993 .

Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, J. Tirole, 1985 .

Limit Games and Limit Equilibria

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, 1986 .

Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, 1989 .

Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, 1981 .

When Are Agents Negligible

D. Levine, W. Pesendorfer, 1995 .

When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, W. Pesendorfer, 1996 .

When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, W. Pesendorfer, 1998 .

Is Behavioral Economics Doomed? The Ordinary versus the Extraordinary

D. Levine, 2012 .

Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, Eddie Dekel, 1999 .

The Case Against Intellectual Property

D. Levine, M. Boldrin, 2002 .

Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments

D. Levine, 1998 .

What's Intellectual Property Good for?

David K. Levine, Michele Boldrin, D. Levine, 2013 .

The Case Against Patents

D. Levine, M. Boldrin, David K. Levine, 2012 .

Competition and Innovation

D. Levine, P. Aghion, M. Boldrin, 2009 .

The Case Against Intellectual Monopoly, Chapter 1

D. Levine, M. Boldrin, 2003 .

Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, 1992 .

Against Intellectual Monopoly

David K. Levine, Michele Boldrin, D. Levine, 2008 .

Tail probabilities for triangular arrays

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, 2013 .

Does Market Incompleteness Matter

David K. Levine, William R. Zame, D. Levine, 2002 .

The Evolution of Cooperation Through Imitation 1

D. Levine, W. Pesendorfer, 1999 .

On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements

David M. Kreps, D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, 1988 .

Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, 1994 .

Fairness, Risk Preferences and Independence: Impossibility Theorems

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, 2011 .

The Relationship between Economic Theory and Experiments

D. Levine, Jie Zheng, 2015 .

The Relationship of Economic Theory to Experiments 1 July 20 , 2010

D. Levine, Jie Zheng, 2010 .

Measuring Players' Losses in Experimental Games

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, 1997 .

Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments 1

D. Levine, 1995 .

The Relationship of Economic Theory to Experiments 1 February

D. Levine, 2022 .

Partisan Politics and Aggregation Failure with Ignorant Voters, with Faruk

Jeroen M. Swinkels, D. Levine, Faruk Gul, 2004 .

Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities

Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine, Jean Tirole, 1987 .

Learning in Games

Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine, D. Fudenberg, 1998 .

Efficiency and Observability in Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players

Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine, D. Fudenberg, 1994 .

The whip and the Bible: Punishment versus internalization

David K. Levine, Rohan Dutta, Salvatore Modica, 2021, Journal of Public Economic Theory.

TRADE ASSOCIATIONS: WHY NOT CARTELS?

D. Levine, S. Modica, A. Mattozzi, 2020, International Economic Review.

Essays on the Economics of Social Interaction

D. Levine, J. Pinole, 2019 .

A folk theorem with codes of conduct and communication

Juan I. Block, D. Levine, 2017 .

VOTING LEADERS AND VOTING PARTICIPATION

D. Levine, César Martinelli, H. Herrera, 2004 .

All the Interesting Questions, Almost All the Wrong Reasons

D. Levine, M. Boldrin, 2007 .

Indeterminacy of Relative Prices in Overlapping Generations Models

D. Levine, T. Kehoe, 1983 .

Promises and Partnership Author ( s ) :

M. Dufwenberg, D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, 2008 .

Timing and Self-Control

Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine, D. Fudenberg, 2012 .

An Evolutionary Model of Intervention and Peace

D. Levine, S. Modica, 2016 .

Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State

D. Levine, S. Modica, 2013 .

Quality Ladders, Competition and Endogenous Growth

David K. Levine, Michele Boldrin, D. Levine, 2010 .

Reputation with Noisy Precommitment

David K. Levine, Cesar Martinelli, D. Levine, 1998 .

Appropriation and Intellectual Property 1 By

D. Levine, M. Boldrin, 2010 .

Bankruptcy and Collateral in Debt Constrained Markets

D. Levine, T. Kehoe, 2006 .

The Reputation Trap

D. Levine, 2019, Econometrica.

The Reputation Trap 1

D. Levine, 2019 .

Market Size and Intellectual Property Protection

David K. Levine, Michele Boldrin, D. Levine, 2009 .

IP and Market Size

D. Levine, M. Boldrin, 2005 .

Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, 1995 .

Recency, consistent learning, and Nash equilibrium

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, 2014, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America.

Self Control , Risk Aversion , and the Allais Paradox

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, 2006 .

Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, 2007 .

A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, 2006 .

An Easier Way to Calibrate

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, 1999 .

Peer discipline and incentives within groups

D. Levine, S. Modica, 2016 .

Conflict and the Evolution of Societies

D. Levine, S. Modica, 2012 .

Evolution Through Imitation in a Single Population

D. Levine, W. Pesendorfer, 2000 .

Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Research Department Staff Report 360 Intellectual Property and Market Size *

D. Levine, M. Boldrin, Chad Jones, 2022 .

Cooperating Through Leaders ⋆

D. Levine, S. Modica, A. Rustichini, 2022 .

Intertemporal Separability in Overlapping Generations Models

D. Levine, T. Kehoe, 1982 .

Interventions when Social Norms are Endogenous: A Critique

D. Levine, S. Modica, Rohan Dutta, 2018 .

Sequential Bargaining with Many Buyers

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, J. Tirole, 1985 .

The Optimum Quantity of Money Revisited

David K. Levine, Michael Woodford, Timothy J. Kehoe, 1992 .

Recency, Consistent Learning, and Nash Equilibrium how this access benefits you. Your story matters

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, 2013 .

Voter Turnout with Peer Punishment

D. Levine, A. Mattozzi, 2020 .

When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible? made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, W. Pesendorfer, 1996 .

RESTRICTING REGRESSION SLOPES IN THE ERRORS-IN-VARIABLES MODEL BY BOUNDING THE ERROR CORRELATION

Toni M. Whited, D. Levine, Edward Leamer, 1993 .

True Myths

D. Levine, 2022 .

Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, 1996 .

Conditional Universal Consistency

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, 1999 .

Extensive Form Games

D. Levine, 2008 .

Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities this you.

D. Levine, 2005 .

Learning and the Stock Flow Model

D. Levine, 1997 .

A Theory of the Dynamics of Factor Shares ∗

D. Levine, M. Boldrin, Yong Wang, 2022 .

Continuous Time Models of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, 2006 .

Patents and the Dissemination of Inventions

D. Levine, M. Boldrin, 2013 .

Introduction to Learning in Games: A Symposium in Honor of David Blackwell

David K. Levine, Dean P. Foster, Rakesh V. Vohra, 1999 .

Phoenix From the Ashes: The Evolution of Mechanism Designers

D. Levine, 2022 .

Indeterminacy in Applied Intertemporal Equilibrium Models

D. Levine, T. Kehoe, 1990 .

THE ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY ANNUAL REPORTS REPORT OF THE EDITORS 2004-2005

D. Levine, W. Newey, Andrew Postlewaite, 2005 .

Intervention with limited information

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, 2021, International Journal of Game Theory.

Earthquakes, Religion, and Transition to Self-government

D. Levine, S. Bowles, S. Naidu, 2016 .

Interventions with Sticky Social Norms: A Critique

D. Levine, S. Modica, Rohan Dutta, 2019, Journal of the European Economic Association.

Peer Monitoring, Ostracism and the Internalization of Social Norms

D. Levine, S. Modica, Rohan Dutta, 2018 .

Learning and Equilibrium

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, David K. Levine, 2009 .

Learning-Theoretic Foundations for Equilibrium Analysis

Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine, D. Fudenberg, 2008 .

Introduction: The Dynamic Games Special Issue

David K. Levine, Aldo Rustichini, D. Levine, 2000 .

The Dynamic Games Special Issue

D. Levine, A. Rustichini, 2000 .

Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2011 with Funding from Boston Library Consortium Iviember Libraries Working Paper Department of Economics Self -confirming Equilibrium

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, 2022 .

Whither game theory? Towards a theory of learning in games

David K. Levine, Drew Fudenberg, D. Fudenberg, 2016 .

Whither Game Theory

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, 2016 .

1 The Development of Game Theory in Economics

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, 2016 .

Perfectly Competitive Innovation

Michele Boldrin, D. Levine, M. Boldrin, 2002 .

Learning in Games: Where Do We Stand

Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine, D. Fudenberg, 1998 .

Voter Participation with Collusive Parties

D. Levine, A. Mattozzi, 2016 .

ADEMU WORKING PAPER SERIES Voter Participation with Collusive Parties

D. Levine, A. Mattozzi, 2016 .

When is Reputation Bad?

Jeffrey C. Ely, D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, 2002, Games Econ. Behav..

The Slippery Slope of Concession

D. Levine, J. Hirshleifer, M. Boldrin, 2009 .

Essays on Political Economy of Economic Reform

D. Levine, J. Hirshleifer, M. Wallerstein, 1993 .

Repeated Games with Frequent Signals

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, 2009 .

A Large Deviation Theorem for Triangular Arrays

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, 2007 .

Rent-seeking and innovation

David K. Levine, Michele Boldrin, D. Levine, 2003 .

Survival of the Weakest: Why the West Rules

D. Levine, S. Modica, 2022, SSRN Electronic Journal.

Self-Control, Social Preferences and the Effect of Delayed Payments

Drew Fudenberg, David G. Rand, Anna Dreber, 2016 .

The Paradox of Voter Participation? A Laboratory Study

David K. Levine, Thomas R. Palfrey, D. Levine, 2007, American Political Science Review.

A remark on serial correlation in maximum likelihood

David K. Levine, D. Levine, 1983 .

Comparative Statics and Perfect Foresight in Infinite Horizon Economies

David K. Levine, Timothy J. Kehoe, D. Levine, 1985 .

Reverse regression for latent-variable models

D. Levine, 1986 .

Gross substitutability in large-square economies

David K. Levine, Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael Woodford, 1991 .

The economics of indeterminacy in overlapping generations models

David K. Levine, Timothy J. Kehoe, D. Levine, 1990 .

Collusion, Randomization, and Leadership in Groups

D. Levine, S. Modica, Rohan Dutta, 2015 .

Anti-Malthus: Conflict and the evolution of societies

D. Levine, S. Modica, 2013 .

Anti-Malthus: Evolution, Population, and the Maximization of Free Resources

D. Levine, S. Modica, 2011 .

Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2011 with Funding from Working Paper Department of Economics the Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, E. Maskin, 2022 .

Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2011 with Funding from Working Paper Partment of Economics Ds Maintaining a Reputation When Strategies Are Imperfectly Observed Drew Fudenberg

David M. Kreps, D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, 2011 .

Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2011 with Funding from Working Paper Department of Economics Reputation, Unobserved Strategies, and Active Suoermartingales by Number 490

David M. Kreps, D. Levine, John McCall, 2011 .

A Long-Run Collaboration on Long-Run Games

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, 2008 .

Reputation and Distribution in a Gift Giving Game

D. Levine, 1996 .

Failing to Provide Public Goods: Why the Afghan Army Did Not Fight

D. Levine, S. Modica, Rohan Dutta, 2022, Review.

On the Emergence of Consensus or Conflicting Social Norms

Juan I. Block, D. Levine, Rohan Dutta, 2021 .

A Tale of Two Subsidies: Why the Afghan Army did not Fight

D. Levine, S. Modica, Rohan Dutta, 2021 .

Labor Associations: The Blue Wall of Silence

D. Levine, S. Modica, A. Mattozzi, 2021 .

Leaders and Social Norms: On the Emergence of Consensus or Conflict1

Juan I. Block, D. Levine, Rohan Dutta, 2021 .

Peer Discipline and the Strength of Organizations

D. Levine, S. Modica, 2013 .

Risk, Delay, and Convex Self-Control Costs

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, 2010 .

Self Control , Risk Aversion , and the Allais Paradox

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, 2006 .

Evolution and Information in a Gift-Giving Game

David K. Levine, Philip Johnson, Philip A. Johnson, 2001, J. Econ. Theory.

Is Behavioral Economics Doomed

D. Levine, 2009 .

Maintaining A Reputation Against A Patient Opponent

Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine, Marco Celentani, 2006 .

DETERRENCE IN THE COLD WAR AND THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’

D. Levine, R. Levine, 2006 .

Reputation with Noisy Precommitment 1

D. Levine, César Martinelli, 1997 .

Question: When does the prospect of future punishment enable a player to achieve an effective commitment? October 15: Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players

D. Levine, 1990 .

Monopoly and credibility in asset markets : an example

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, 1989 .

Debt-Constrained Asset Markets

David K. Levine, Timothy J. Kehoe, D. Levine, 1993 .

Individual Preferences for Giving ∗

Gary E. Bolton, D. Levine, M. Bazerman, 2005 .

Collusion constrained equilibrium

D. Levine, S. Modica, Rohan Dutta, 2018 .

Balanced-Budget Mechanisms with Incomplete Information

Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine, Eric Maskin, 1996 .

Growth Cycles and Market Crashes

David K. Levine, Michele Boldrin, D. Levine, 2000, J. Econ. Theory.

Growth Cycles and Market Crashes

D. Levine, M. Boldrin, 1999 .

Consumer Search , Price Dispersion , and Asymmetric Pricing

S. Bikhchandani, D. Levine, B. Ellickson, 2006 .

Liquidity Constrained Markets Versus Debt Constrained Markets

D. Levine, T. Kehoe, 2001 .

Liquidity Constrained vs. Debt Constrained Markets

D. Levine, T. Kehoe, 2000 .

Learning with Recency Bias

Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine, D. Fudenberg, 2013 .

Production Chains

D. Levine, David K. Levine, 2010 .

The evolution of cooperation through imitation

David K. Levine, Wolfgang Pesendorfer, D. Levine, 2002, Games Econ. Behav..

Does Intellectual Monopoly Help Innovation?

David K. Levine, Michele Boldrin, D. Levine, 2009 .

Introduction to the special issue in honor of Lloyd Shapley: Eight topics in game theory

David K. Levine, D. Levine, 2018, Games Econ. Behav..

Monopoly and the Incentive to Innovate When Adoption Involves Switchover Disruptions

James A. Schmitz, D. Levine, T. Holmes, 2008 .

Entertaining Malthus: Bread, Circuses, and Economic Growth

Nicholas W. Papageorge, D. Levine, Rohan Dutta, 2018 .

Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2011 with Funding from Boston Library Consortium Iviember Libraries Sequeirrial Bargaining Vteth Many

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, J. Tirole, 2011 .

Strike Activity, Wage Settlements and Rationality

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, P. Ruud, 1984 .

Evolution and Information in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game

D. Levine, W. Pesendorfer, Phillip Johnson, 1998 .

Learning to Play Bayesian Games

Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine, Eddie Dekel, 2001, Games Econ. Behav..

Twin peaks: Expressive externality in group participation

D. Levine, S. Modica, Junze Sun, 2023, Journal of Public Economic Theory.

When is Appeasement a Sign of Strength? (cid:73)

D. Levine, L. Ohanian, 2023 .

Lotteries, Sunspots, and Incentive Constraints

David K. Levine, Edward C. Prescott, Timothy J. Kehoe, 2002, J. Econ. Theory.

Policy Platforms, Campaign Spending and Voter Participation

David K. Levine, Cesar Martinelli, Helios Herrera, 2008 .

Size, fungibility, and the strength of lobbying organizations

D. Levine, S. Modica, 2017 .

The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Information

Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine, Eric Maskin, 1994 .

On characterizing equilibria of economies with externalities and taxes as solutions to optimization problems

D. Levine, P. Romer, T. Kehoe, 1992 .

Appropriation and Intellectual Property

D. Levine, M. Boldrin, 2008 .

Intellectual Property and the Efficient Allocation of Social Surplus from Creation

D. Levine, M. Boldrin, 2008 .

Growth and Intellectual Property

D. Levine, M. Boldrin, 2006 .

Self-Confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique

Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine, D. Fudenberg, 2007, J. Econ. Theory.

Maintaining a reputation against a long-lived opponent

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, W. Pesendorfer, 1993 .

Learning Dynamics Based on Social Comparisons

Juan I. Block, D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, 2017 .

Learning dynamics with social comparisons and limited memory

Juan I. Block, D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, 2019, Theoretical Economics.

An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, 1991 .

On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, Zacharias Maniadis, 2010 .

Subjective Uncertainty over Behavior Strategies: A Correction

Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine, Eddie Dekel, 2002, J. Econ. Theory.

Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 1 First version : April 25 , 1995 This revision : July 12 , 1999

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, Eddie Dekel, 1999 .

Re-examining coherent arbitrariness for the evaluation of common goods and simple lotteries

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, Zacharias Maniadis, 2010 .

A unifying learning framework for building artificial game-playing agents

Yixin Chen, David K. Levine, Wenlin Chen, 2015, Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence.

EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFFS LONG-RUN AND SHORT-RUN PLAYERS AND IMPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, 1989 .

Self-Confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique 1

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, 2007 .

The economics of ideas and intellectual property.

Michele Boldrin, David K Levine, D. Levine, 2005, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America.

AGS ( Comp ) – 1 A Pages Mark all alterations on these page proofs

D. Levine, M. Boldrin, Juan Luis Correa Allamand, 2011 .

The Brother-in-Law Effect

D. Levine, Felipe Zurita, F. Weinschelbaum, 2005 .

DEPARTAMENTO DE ECONOMÍA DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO “The Brother in Law Effect”

D. Levine, Felipe Zurita, F. Weinschelbaum, 2005 .

Market Structure and Property Rights in Open Source Industries

David K. Levine, Michele Boldrin, D. Levine, 2008 .

Altruism and Self Control

Drew Fudenberg, David G. Rand, David K. Levine, 2014 .

Quantum Games Have No News For Economics

David K. Levine, D. Levine, 2005 .

When is Reputation Bad?

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, J. Ely, 2004 .

Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players are Patient

Drew Fudenberg, Satoru Takahashi, David K. Levine, 2004, Games Econ. Behav..

Superstition and Rational Learning

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, David K. Levine, 2006 .

Can A Turing Player Identify Itself

David K. Levine, Balázs Szentes, D. Levine, 2006 .

Globalization, intellectual property, and economic prosperity

D. Levine, M. Boldrin, 2006 .

Evolution of Impatience: The Example of the Farmer-Sheriff Game

D. Levine, S. Modica, Felipe Zurita, 2015 .

Virtual Model Validation for Economics

D. Levine, 2010 .

Secondary arteriovenous fistula

D. Levine, S. Shenoy, 2012 .

An approximate dual-self model and paradoxes of choice under risk

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, Zacharias Maniadis, 2012 .

Repeated Games with Frequent Signals

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, 2009 .

2003 Lawrence R. Klein Lecture: The Case Against Intellectual Monopoly

David K. Levine, Michele Boldrin, D. Levine, 2004 .

Against Intellectual Monopoly: Does Intellectual Monopoly Increase Innovation?

D. Levine, M. Boldrin, 2008 .

Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Research Department Staff Report 339 Ier Lawrence Klein Lecture: the Case against Intellectual Monopoly

D. Levine, M. Boldrin, 2022 .

Intellectual Property, innovation and the governance of the internet

D. Levine, 2013 .

A Model of Discovery

David K. Levine, Michele Boldrin, D. Levine, 2009 .

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE LONG RUNf

D. Levine, 2009 .

Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Research Department Staff Report 347 Rent-seeking and Innovation

D. Levine, M. Boldrin, 2022 .

Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Research Department Staff Report 357 the Economics of Ideas and Intellectual Property

D. Levine, M. Boldrin, 2022 .

Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Research Department Staff Report 301 Factor Saving Innovation *

David K. Levine, Michele Boldrin, D. Levine, 2022 .

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE SCALE OF THE MARKET

D. Levine, M. Boldrin, 2022 .

Radical Markets by Eric Posner and E. Glen Weyl: A Review Essay

D. Levine, 2020, Journal of Economic Literature.

Intervention and peace*

D. Levine, S. Modica, 2018, Economic Policy.

Debt constraints and equilibrium in infinite horizon economies with incomplete markets

D. Levine, W. Zame, 1996 .

Learning and Belief Based Trade

Drew Fudenberg, D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, 2006 .

Learning in the Stock Flow Model

David K. Levine, D. Levine, 1997 .

Market for Degrees and Educational Standards

D. Levine, S. Modica, 2013 .

Fine cartels

D. Levine, 2021, Economic Theory Bulletin.

2 A Simple Insurance Problem : A Motivating Example

D. Levine, E. Prescott, T. Kehoe, 2008 .

Lotteries , Sunspots , and Incentive Constraints 1

D. Levine, T. Kehoe, 2002 .

Perfectly Competitive Innovation (Growth)

D. Levine, M. Boldrin, 2005 .

Infinite horizon equilibrium with incomplete markets

D. Levine, 1989 .

Size, fungibility, and the strength of lobbying organizations

D. Levine, S. Modica, 2017 .

The Sense of Theory in Political Economy

D. Levine, 1989 .

Sequential Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, 1982 .

Enforcement of Collusion in Oligopoly

D. Levine, 1982 .

The Enforcement of Collusion in a Simple Oligopoly

D. Levine, 1981 .

The sensitivity of MLE to measurement error

D. Levine, 1985 .

Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Single Long-Run Player

Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine, D. Fudenberg, 1989 .

Open-loop and closed-loop equilibria in dynamic games with many players

Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine, D. Fudenberg, 1988 .

Determinacy of equilibria in dynamic models with finitely many consumers

D. Levine, P. Romer, T. Kehoe, 1990 .

Indeterminacy in Applied Intertemporal General Equilibrium Models

D. Levine, T. Kehoe, 1990 .

The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games

Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine, D. Fudenberg, 2007, J. Econ. Theory.