Adversarial Modeling and Reasoning in the Maritime Domain - Year 1 Report

A number of real-world security scenarios can be cast as a problem of transiting an area patrolled by a mobile adversary, where the transiting agent aims to choose its route so as to minimize the probability of encountering the patrolling agent, and vice versa. We model this problem as a twoplayer zero-sum game on a graph, termed the transit game. In contrast to the existing models of area transit, where one of the players is stationary, we assume both players are mobile. We also explicitly model the limited endurance of the patroller and the notion of a base to which the patroller has to repeatedly return. Noting the prohibitive size of the strategy spaces of both players, we develop singleand double-oracle based algorithms including a novel acceleration scheme, to obtain optimum route selection strategies for both players. We evaluate the developed approach on a range of transit game instances inspired by real-world security problems in the urban and naval security domains.

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