Software Assistants for Randomized Patrol Planning for the LAX Airport Police and the Federal Air Marshal Service
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Manish Jain | Milind Tambe | Fernando Ordóñez | Christopher Kiekintveld | Jason Tsai | James Pita | Shyamsunder Rathi | Milind Tambe | F. Ordóñez | Christopher Kiekintveld | Manish Jain | J. Tsai | J. Pita | Shyamsunder Rathi
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