Equilibrium Refinement through Negotiation in Binary Voting

We study voting games on binary issues, where voters might hold an objective over some issues at stake, while willing to strike deals on the remaining ones, and can influence one another's voting decision before the vote takes place. We analyse voters' rational behaviour in the resulting two-phase game, showing under what conditions undesirable equilibria can be removed as an effect of the prevote phase.

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