Economics of Alliances: The Lessons for Collective Action
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] T. Schelling. The Strategy of Conflict , 1963 .
[2] Roland N. McKean,et al. Economics of Defense , 1964 .
[3] J. M. Buchanan,et al. An Economic Theory of Clubs , 1965 .
[4] M. Olson,et al. The Logic of Collective Action , 1965 .
[5] R. Zeckhauser,et al. An economic theory of alliances , 1966 .
[6] Collective Goods, Comparative Advantage, and Alliance Efficiency , 1967 .
[7] Jacques van Ypersele de Strihou. Sharing the Defense Burden Among Western Allies , 1967 .
[8] Public Expenditures in Communist and Capitalist Nations. , 1969 .
[9] J. M. Jackson. Public Expenditures in Communist and Capitalist Nations , 1969 .
[10] B. Russett,et al. Collective Goods and International Organization , 1971, International Organization.
[12] Harvey E. Starr. A Collective Goods Analysis of the Warsaw Pact after Czechoslovakia , 1974, International Organization.
[13] O. Williamson. Markets and hierarchies, analysis and antitrust implications : a study in the economics of internal organization , 1975 .
[14] Todd Sandler,et al. On the Economic Theory of Alliances , 1975 .
[15] Leonard M. Dudley. Foreign Aid and the Theory of Alliances , 1979 .
[16] T. Sandler,et al. The Design of Supranational StructuresAn Economic Perspective , 1977 .
[17] Todd Sandler,et al. IMPURITY OF DEFENSE: AN APPLICATION TO THE ECONOMICS OF ALLIANCES , 1977 .
[18] Burden sharing in NATO , 1979 .
[19] T. Sandler,et al. BURDEN SHARING, STRATEGY, AND THE DESIGN OF NATO , 1980 .
[20] Ronald Smith,et al. The Demand for Military Expenditure , 1980 .
[21] C. Montmarquette,et al. The demand for military expenditures: An international comparison , 1981 .
[22] Mancur Olson,et al. The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities. , 1983 .
[23] M. McGuire. U.S. Assistance, Israeli Allocation, and the Arms Race in the Middle East , 1982 .
[24] Todd Sandler,et al. A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of NATO , 1982 .
[25] J. Hirshleifer. From weakest-link to best-shot: The voluntary provision of public goods , 1983 .
[26] Todd Sandler,et al. EASY RIDERS, JOINT PRODUCTION, AND PUBLIC GOODS* , 1984 .
[27] B. Nalebuff,et al. Dragon-slaying and ballroom dancing: The private supply of a public good , 1984 .
[28] Todd Sandler,et al. Complementarity, free riding, and the military expenditures of NATO allies , 1984 .
[29] Carl H. Groth,et al. A Method for Identifying the Public Good Allocation Process Within a Group , 1985 .
[30] J. Murdoch,et al. AUSTRALIAN DEMAND FOR MILITARY EXPENDITURES: 1961 ‐ 1979* , 1985 .
[31] Todd Sandler,et al. The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods , 1986 .
[32] H. Varian,et al. On the private provision of public goods , 1986 .
[33] Game theory in international economics , 1986 .
[34] T. L. Schwartz. The Logic of Collective Action , 1986 .
[35] Todd Sandler,et al. NATO Burden-sharing: Rules or Reality? , 1987 .
[36] Wallace J. Thies. Alliances and Collective Goods , 1987 .
[37] Bruce R. Kingma. An Accurate Measurement of the Crowd-out Effect, Income Effect, and Price Effect for Charitable Contributions , 1989, Journal of Political Economy.
[38] Mark A. Boyer. Trading Public Goods in the Western Alliance System , 1989 .
[39] Ronald Smith. Models of military expenditure , 1989 .
[40] J. O'neal,et al. NATO Burden Sharing and the Forces of Change , 1989 .
[41] Neil Bruce,et al. Defence Expenditures by Countries in Allied and Adversarial Relationships , 1990 .
[42] Mark A. Boyer. A simple and untraditional analysis of western alliance burden‐sharing , 1990 .
[43] J. Murdoch,et al. On distinguishing the behavior of nuclear and non‐nuclear allies in NATO , 1990 .
[44] Glenn Palmer. Alliance Politics and Issue Areas: Determinants of Defense Spending , 1990 .
[45] M. McGuire. Mixed public‐private benefit and public‐good supply with application to the NATO alliance , 1990 .
[46] T. Sandler,et al. The Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance 1880–1914: A Collective Goods Approach , 1990, American Political Science Review.
[47] John R. Oneal,et al. The theory of collective action and burden sharing in NATO , 1990, International Organization.
[48] J. Murdoch,et al. Nash-Cournot or Lindahl Behavior?: An Empirical Test for the NATO Allies , 1990 .
[49] J. O'neal. Testing the Theory of Collective Action , 1990 .
[50] Glenn Palmer. Corralling the Free Rider: Deterrence and the Western Alliance , 1990 .
[51] Kar-yiu Wong. Foreign trade, military alliance, and defence‐burden sharing , 1991 .
[52] Keith Hartley,et al. The economics of defence policy , 1991 .
[53] B. Hilton,et al. The McGuire model and the economics of the NATO alliance , 1991 .
[54] Glenn Palmer. Deterrence, defense spending, and elasticity: Alliance contributions to the public good , 1991 .
[55] M. Okamura. Estimating the Impact of the Soviet Union's Threat on the United States-Japan Alliance: A Demand System Approach , 1991 .
[56] J. Murdoch,et al. NATO Burden Sharing and the Forces of Change: Further Observations , 1991 .
[57] S. Mills. The Financing of UN Peacekeeping Operations: The Need for a Sound Financial Basis , 1991 .
[58] J. Murdoch,et al. An Econometric Technique for Comparing Median Voter and Oligarchy Choice Models of Collective Action: The Case of the NATO Alliance , 1991 .
[59] S. Mehay,et al. Burden sharing in the NATO alliance: An empirical test of alternative views , 1991 .
[60] J. D. Morrow. Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances , 1991 .
[61] Todd Sandler,et al. The Economics of defence spending : an international survey , 1992 .
[62] John A. C. Conybeare. A Portfolio Diversification Model of Alliances , 1992 .
[63] J. O'neal. Budgetary savings from conscription and burden sharing in NATO , 1992 .
[64] Todd Sandler,et al. Collective Action: Theory and Applications , 1992 .
[65] Robert Powell,et al. Guns, Butter, and Anarchy , 1993, American Political Science Review.
[66] Cooperative versus Noncooperative Behavior: The Case of Agricultural Research , 1993 .
[67] Todd Sandler,et al. Tropical Deforestation: Markets and Market Failures , 1993 .
[68] R. Axelrod,et al. A Landscape Theory of Aggregation , 1993, British Journal of Political Science.
[69] J. Murdoch,et al. Alternative Collective-Goods Models of Military Alliances: Theory and Empirics , 1994 .
[70] J. D. Morrow. Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs , 1994 .
[71] Todd Sandler,et al. The comparative static properties of the impure public good model , 1994 .
[72] Todd Sandler,et al. AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH EXPENDITURES IN THE UNITED STATES: A PUBLIC GOODS PERSPECTIVE , 1994 .
[73] Randall L. Schweller. Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In , 1994 .
[74] Paul W. Schroeder. Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory , 1994 .
[75] Steven L. Rearden. NATO’s Strategy: Past, Present, and Future , 1995 .
[76] T. Sandler,et al. Management of Transnational Commons: Coordination, Publicness, and Treaty Formation , 1995 .
[77] Todd Sandler,et al. Handbook of Defense Economics , 1995 .
[78] A. Roberts. From San Francisco to Sarajevo: The UN and the use of force , 1995 .
[79] Roger H. Palin. Multinational Military Forces: Problems and Prospects , 1995 .
[80] NATO after the January 1994 Summit: The View from Brussels , 1995 .
[81] Richard L. Kugler,et al. NATO expansion: The next steps , 1995 .
[82] S. Hill,et al. Peacekeeping and the United Nations , 1996 .
[83] Todd Sandler,et al. Nato burden sharing: 1960–1992 , 1996 .
[84] Ronald D. Asmus,et al. What will NATO enlargement cost , 1996 .
[85] R. Cornes,et al. The theory of externalities, public goods and club goods. 2nd. ed. , 1996 .
[86] Todd Sandler,et al. Global Challenges: An Approach to Environmental, Political, and Economic Problems , 1997 .
[87] America and Europe : a partnership for a new era , 1997 .
[88] Todd Sandler,et al. Conscription, peace‐keeping, and foreign assistance: NATO burden sharing in the post‐cold war era , 1997 .
[89] Todd Sandler,et al. A Tale of Two Collectives: Sulphur versus Nitrogen Oxides Emission Reduction in Europe , 1997 .
[90] T. Sandler,et al. The Economics of Defense , 1995 .
[91] Mark A. Boyer,et al. Maintaining System Stability , 1997 .
[92] J. Murdoch,et al. The voluntary provision of a pure public good: The case of reduced CFC emissions and the Montreal Protocol , 1997 .
[93] T. Sandler. Global and regional public goods: a prognosis for collective action , 1998 .
[94] Kenneth W. Abbott,et al. Why States Act through Formal International Organizations , 1998 .
[95] T. Sandler,et al. When does Partial Cooperation Pay , 1998 .
[96] T. Sandler,et al. Sharing the Financial Burden for U.N. and NATO Peacekeeping, 1976-1996 , 1998 .
[97] Todd Sandler,et al. Equilibrium Existence and Uniqueness in Public Good Models: An Elementary Proof Via Contraction , 1999 .
[98] Todd Sandler,et al. Alliance Formation, Alliance Expansion, and the Core , 1999 .
[99] T. Sandler,et al. The Demand for Un Peacekeeping, 1975-1996 , 1999 .
[100] David A. Lake. Entangling Relations: American Foreign Policy in Its Century , 2001 .
[101] Todd Sandler,et al. The political economy of NATO : past, present, and into the 21st century , 1999 .
[102] Keith Hartley,et al. NATO Burden-Sharing: Past and Future , 1999 .
[103] Scott Barrett. Montreal versus Kyoto , 1999 .
[104] T. Sandler,et al. The Future of Development Assistance: Common Pools and International Public Goods , 1999 .
[105] Inge Kaul,et al. Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century , 1999 .
[106] A. Dixit. Mancur Olson--Social Scientist , 1999 .
[107] Glenn Palmer,et al. Multiple Goals or Deterrence , 1999 .
[108] D. Kelleher. Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century , 2000 .
[109] Todd Sandler,et al. Partners in giving:: The crowding-in effects of UK government grants , 2000 .
[110] Toshihiro Ihori. Defense Expenditures and Allied Cooperation , 2000 .
[111] J. Murdoch,et al. On Sharing NATO Defence Burdens in the 1990s and Beyond , 2000 .
[112] L. Potvin,et al. A theoretical and empirical analysis of context: neighbourhoods, smoking and youth. , 2002, Social science & medicine.