Coevolution of strategies in n-person Prisoner ' s Dilemma

The evolution of strategies in the iterated n-person Prisoner's Dilemma game is studied in various types of models. By varying the payoff parameters and other characteristics of the models, we investigate some circumstances under which cooperative behaviour evolves, both in a mean-field situation (where all interact with all) and in a spatially extended system on a lattice using a cellular automaton dynamics (with only local interactions). In one class of mean-field models, cooperative behaviour may dominate in a dynamics that avoids less cooperative stable fix points. We also present and briefly discuss models that use finite automata as representation for the strategies.

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