The three R's of trust

Trust is fundamental to all human exchange. It is therefore necessary to understand the behavioural logic and neural underpinnings of how it is established, maintained, broken, and repaired. There are open evolutionary questions about how trust mechanisms should and do evolve; however, here we focus on more proximate psychological and neural mechanisms that mediate trust. Our perspective singles out three basic features: (1) reaping; (2) regarding; and (3) recursive modelling. Reaping involves mechanisms that respond to punishment or reward. Regarding comprises other-regarding or pro-social mechanisms. Recursive modelling encompasses hierarchical cognitive modelling of others through exchanges. Modern work has begun to reveal how these features are realized as modifications to conventional decision-making systems and how they malfunction in disease and injury.

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