Games with imperfectly observable commitment
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] Sjaak Hurkens. Learning by Forgetful Players , 1995 .
[2] E. Kalai,et al. Persistent equilibria in strategic games , 1984 .
[3] R. Selten. Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games , 1975, Classics in Game Theory.
[4] J. Mertens,et al. ON THE STRATEGIC STABILITY OF EQUILIBRIA , 1986 .
[5] J. Harsanyi. A new theory of equilibrium selection for games with complete information , 1995 .
[6] William R. Zame,et al. The Algebraic Geometry of Games and the Tracing Procedure , 1991 .
[7] R. Myerson. Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept , 1978 .
[8] Reinhard Selten,et al. A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. Chapter 3: Consequence of desirable properties , 1982 .
[9] K. Bagwell. Commitment and observability in games , 1995 .
[10] E. Vandamme. Stability and perfection of nash equilibria , 1987 .
[11] T. Schelling. The Strategy of Conflict , 1963 .
[12] John C. Harsanyi,et al. Общая теория выбора равновесия в играх / A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games , 1989 .
[13] H. Stackelberg,et al. Marktform und Gleichgewicht , 1935 .
[14] J. Harsanyi. The tracing procedure: A Bayesian approach to defining a solution forn-person noncooperative games , 1975 .
[15] Sjaak Hurkens. Learning by Forgetful Players: From Primitive Formations to Persistent Retracts , 1994 .