Incentives in One-Sided Matching Problems With Ordinal Preferences
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] J. Harsanyi. Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility , 1955 .
[2] M. Utku Ünver,et al. Dynamic Kidney Exchange , 2007 .
[3] K. Larson,et al. An Empirical Comparison of One-Sided Matching Mechanisms , 2016 .
[4] Sven Seuken,et al. An axiomatic approach to characterizing and relaxing strategyproofness of one-sided matching mechanisms , 2014, EC.
[5] Sven Seuken,et al. The Power of Local Manipulation Strategies in Assignment Mechanisms , 2015, IJCAI.
[6] P. Slovic. Choice Between Equally Valued Alternatives. , 1975 .
[7] Martin L. Puterman,et al. Markov Decision Processes: Discrete Stochastic Dynamic Programming , 1994 .
[8] Felix Brandt,et al. The Computational Complexity of Random Serial Dictatorship , 2013, WINE.
[9] Eyke Hüllermeier,et al. Preferences in AI: An overview , 2011, Artif. Intell..
[10] L. S. Shapley,et al. College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage , 2013, Am. Math. Mon..
[11] Nicholas Mattei,et al. Egalitarianism of Random Assignment Mechanisms , 2015, ArXiv.
[12] Judy Goldsmith,et al. Preference Handling for Artificial Intelligence , 2008, AI Mag..
[13] Peter C. Fishburn,et al. LEXICOGRAPHIC ORDERS, UTILITIES AND DECISION RULES: A SURVEY , 1974 .
[14] Hitoshi Matsushima,et al. Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Volume 1 (Book) , 2004 .
[15] Kurt Mehlhorn,et al. Rank-maximal matchings , 2004, TALG.
[16] Toby Walsh,et al. Manipulating the Probabilistic Serial Rule , 2015, AAMAS.
[17] Craig Boutilier,et al. Elicitation and Approximately Stable Matching with Partial Preferences , 2013, IJCAI.
[18] Hadi Hosseini. One-Sided Matching with Dynamic Preferences , 2015, AAMAS.
[19] Morimitsu Kurino,et al. Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin Für Sozialforschung (wzb) Market Behavior an Experimental Study on the Incentives of the Probabilistic Serial Mechanism an Experimental Study on the Incentives of the Probabilistic Serial Mechanism , 2022 .
[20] Lars-Gunnar Svensson. Queue allocation of indivisible goods , 1994 .
[21] J. Sethuraman,et al. Lotteries in Student Assignment: An Equivalence Result. NBER Working Paper No. 16140. , 2010 .
[22] Yann Chevaleyre,et al. Reaching Envy-Free States in Distributed Negotiation Settings , 2007, IJCAI.
[23] Toby Walsh,et al. Strategic Behavior when Allocating Indivisible Goods Sequentially , 2013, AAAI.
[24] J. Sethuraman,et al. A note on object allocation under lexicographic preferences , 2014 .
[25] W. C. Benton,et al. Workforce staffing and scheduling: Hospital nursing specific models , 1992 .
[26] Jonathan F. Bard,et al. Preference scheduling for nurses using column generation , 2005, Eur. J. Oper. Res..
[27] Sophie Bade. Serial Dictatorship: The Unique Optimal Allocation Rule When Information is Endogenous , 2012 .
[28] Atila Abdulkadiroglu,et al. HOUSE ALLOCATION WITH EXISTING TENANTS , 1999 .
[29] Sanjeev Khanna,et al. Social Welfare in One-Sided Matching Markets without Money , 2011, APPROX-RANDOM.
[30] M. Manea,et al. Asymptotic ordinal inefficiency of random serial dictatorship , 2009 .
[31] M. Satterthwaite,et al. Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points , 1981 .
[32] Yeon-Koo Che,et al. Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: The 'Boston' Mechanism Reconsidered , 2009 .
[33] Lin Zhou. On a conjecture by gale about one-sided matching problems , 1990 .
[34] D. Medeiros,et al. Accommodating individual preferences in nurse scheduling via auctions and optimization , 2009, Health Care Management Science.
[35] Isa Emin Hafalir,et al. Stability of marriage with externalities , 2006, Int. J. Game Theory.
[36] Makoto Yokoo,et al. Strategy-proof matching with regional minimum quotas , 2014, AAMAS.
[37] Yoav Shoham,et al. Combinatorial Auctions , 2005, Encyclopedia of Wireless Networks.
[38] Felix Brandt,et al. On the tradeoff between economic efficiency and strategy proofness in randomized social choice , 2013, AAMAS.
[39] Wonki Jo Cho,et al. Incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms , 2016, Games Econ. Behav..
[40] Parag A. Pathak,et al. The Boston Public School Match , 2005 .
[41] R. Zeckhauser,et al. The Efficient Allocation of Individuals to Positions , 1979, Journal of Political Economy.
[42] P. Fishburn. Axioms for Lexicographic Preferences , 1975 .
[43] D. Bergemann,et al. The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism , 2008 .
[44] P. Pathak. Lotteries in Student Assignment , 2006 .
[45] Kate Larson,et al. Matching with Dynamic Ordinal Preferences , 2015, AAAI.
[46] S. Brams,et al. Prisoners' Dilemma and Professional Sports Drafts , 1979 .
[47] Kate Larson,et al. Investigating the Characteristics of One-Sided Matching Mechanisms: (Extended Abstract) , 2016, AAMAS.
[48] Ilya Segal,et al. An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism , 2013 .
[49] Makoto Yokoo,et al. Strategyproof Matching with Minimum Quotas , 2016, TEAC.
[50] Greg Hines,et al. Preference elicitation for risky prospects , 2010, AAMAS.
[51] Theodore Groves,et al. Incentives in Teams , 1973 .
[52] Kate Larson,et al. On Manipulablity of Random Serial Dictatorship in Sequential Matching with Dynamic Preferences , 2015, AAAI.
[53] Lars-Gunnar Svensson. Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods , 1999 .
[54] Hervé Moulin,et al. A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem , 2001, J. Econ. Theory.
[55] R. Vohra,et al. Algorithmic Game Theory: Mechanism Design without Money , 2007 .
[56] Itai Ashlagi,et al. Mix and match: A strategyproof mechanism for multi-hospital kidney exchange , 2013, Games Econ. Behav..
[57] S. Pápai,et al. Strategyproof and Nonbossy Multiple Assignments , 2001 .
[58] Özgün Ekici,et al. An equilibrium analysis of the probabilistic serial mechanism , 2016, Int. J. Game Theory.
[59] Ruggiero Cavallo,et al. Mechanism design for dynamic settings , 2009, SECO.
[60] Kate Larson,et al. Strategyproof Quota Mechanisms for Multiple Assignment Problems , 2015, ArXiv.
[61] John von Neumann,et al. 1. A Certain Zero-sum Two-person Game Equivalent to the Optimal Assignment Problem , 1953 .
[62] Eun Jeong Heo,et al. Probabilistic Assignment of Objects: Characterizing the Serial Rule , 2011, J. Econ. Theory.
[63] Edward P. K. Tsang,et al. Empowerment scheduling for a field workforce , 2011, J. Sched..
[64] K. Sycara,et al. This Is a Publication of the American Association for Artificial Intelligence Multiagent Systems Multiagent System Issues and Challenges Individual Agent Reasoning Task Allocation Multiagent Planning Recognizing and Resolving Conflicts Managing Communication Modeling Other Agents Managing Resources , 2022 .
[65] John R. Chamberlin,et al. Representative Deliberations and Representative Decisions: Proportional Representation and the Borda Rule , 1983, American Political Science Review.
[66] Mohammad Akbarpour,et al. Thickness and Information in Dynamic Matching Markets , 2018, Journal of Political Economy.
[67] Makoto Yokoo,et al. Controlled School Choice with Soft Bounds and Overlapping Types , 2015, AAAI.
[68] Paul R. Milgrom,et al. Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications , 2013 .
[69] Toby Walsh,et al. A Social Welfare Optimal Sequential Allocation Procedure , 2013, IJCAI.
[70] Simina Brânzei,et al. Matchings with externalities and attitudes , 2013, AAMAS.
[71] Jonathan A. Stirk,et al. Singleton bias and lexicographic preferences among equally valued alternatives , 1999 .
[72] Sven Seuken,et al. Hybrid Mechanisms: Trading off Strategyproofness and Efficiency of Random Assignment Mechanisms , 2013 .
[73] Yoav Shoham,et al. Multiagent Systems - Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations , 2009 .
[74] S. Pápai,et al. Strategyproof multiple assignment using quotas , 2000 .
[75] Andrew McLennan,et al. Ordinal Efficiency and the Polyhedral Separating Hyperplane Theorem , 2002, J. Econ. Theory.
[76] M. F. Luce,et al. The Rationalizing Effects of Cognitive Load on Emotion-Based Trade-off Avoidance , 2004 .
[77] Judy Goldsmith,et al. The AI conference paper assignment problem , 2007, AAAI 2007.
[78] Helder Coelho,et al. Dynamic Matching with a Fall-Back Option , 2012 .
[79] Toby Walsh,et al. Equilibria Under the Probabilistic Serial Rule , 2015, IJCAI.
[80] Atila Abdulkadiro,et al. Dynamic House Allocations , 2007 .
[81] Alvin E. Roth,et al. Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis , 1990 .
[82] Atila Abdulkadiroglu,et al. RANDOM SERIAL DICTATORSHIP AND THE CORE FROM RANDOM ENDOWMENTS IN HOUSE ALLOCATION PROBLEMS , 1998 .
[83] Vijay V. Vazirani,et al. Allocation of Divisible Goods Under Lexicographic Preferences , 2012, FSTTCS.
[84] M. Satterthwaite. Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions , 1975 .
[85] Craig Boutilier,et al. Planning, Learning and Coordination in Multiagent Decision Processes , 1996, TARK.
[86] K. Arrow. Essays in the theory of risk-bearing , 1958 .
[87] Rakesh V. Vohra,et al. Dynamic mechanism design , 2012 .
[88] Jérôme Lang,et al. Manipulating picking sequences , 2014, ECAI.
[89] R. Kohli,et al. Representation and Inference of Lexicographic Preference Models and Their Variants , 2007 .
[90] Bettina Klaus,et al. Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems , 2003, Soc. Choice Welf..
[91] Fuhito Kojima,et al. Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects , 2009, Math. Soc. Sci..
[92] N. Nisan,et al. Algorithmic Game Theory: Combinatorial Auctions , 2007 .
[93] Lloyd S. Shapley,et al. The Shapley value: Utility comparison and the theory of games , 1967 .
[94] R. Townsend. Optimal Multiperiod Contracts and the Gain from Enduring Relationships under Private Information , 1982, Journal of Political Economy.
[95] J. Orlin,et al. Greedoid-Based Noncompensatory Inference , 2007 .
[96] Francis Bloch,et al. Markovian assignment rules , 2011, Social Choice and Welfare.
[97] Josef Hadar,et al. Rules for Ordering Uncertain Prospects , 1969 .
[98] H. Varian. Equity, Envy and Efficiency , 1974 .
[99] Gerhard Weiss,et al. Multiagent Systems , 1999 .
[100] Jorge Alcalde-Unzu,et al. Do we agree? Measuring the cohesiveness of preferences , 2016 .
[101] Barbara Messing,et al. An Introduction to MultiAgent Systems , 2002, Künstliche Intell..
[102] Itai Ashlagi,et al. Kidney exchange in dynamic sparse heterogenous pools , 2013, EC '13.
[103] David Manlove,et al. Algorithmics of Matching Under Preferences , 2013, Bull. EATCS.
[104] Tayfun Sönmez,et al. House Allocation with Existing Tenants: A Characterization , 2006, Games Econ. Behav..
[105] Craig Boutilier,et al. Sequential Auctions for the Allocation of Resources with Complementarities , 1999, IJCAI.
[106] Jay Sethuraman,et al. A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain , 2006, J. Econ. Theory.
[107] Steven J. Brams,et al. The win-win solution - guaranteeing fair shares to everybody , 1999 .
[108] Ramaswamy Chandrasekaran,et al. A Class of Sequential Games , 1971, Oper. Res..
[109] Eric Budish,et al. The Multi-Unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard , 2010 .
[110] L. Shapley,et al. On cores and indivisibility , 1974 .
[111] A. Gibbard. Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result , 1973 .
[112] Gerhard Weiss,et al. Multiagent systems: a modern approach to distributed artificial intelligence , 1999 .
[113] Morimitsu Kurino. House allocation with overlapping generations , 2011 .
[114] Ariel D. Procaccia,et al. Dynamic Matching via Weighted Myopia with Application to Kidney Exchange , 2012, AAAI.
[115] Arunava Sen,et al. Ordinally Bayesian incentive compatible voting rules , 2004 .
[116] Fuhito Kojima,et al. Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism , 2010, J. Econ. Theory.
[117] Hendrik Van Landeghem,et al. The State of the Art of Nurse Rostering , 2004, J. Sched..
[118] Toby Walsh,et al. Fair assignment of indivisible objects under ordinal preferences , 2013, AAMAS.
[119] M. Utku Ünver,et al. Course Bidding at Business Schools , 2007 .
[120] Daniela Sabán,et al. The Complexity of Computing the Random Priority Allocation Matrix , 2015, Math. Oper. Res..
[121] David C. Parkes,et al. Efficient Mechanisms with Dynamic Populations and Dynamic Types , 2009 .
[122] J. Baron,et al. An Exploratory Study of Choice Rules Favored for High-Stakes Decisions , 1995 .
[123] S. Brams,et al. Efficient Fair Division , 2005 .
[124] Alvin E. Roth,et al. The Handbook of Experimental Economics, Volume 2 , 2016 .
[125] Ariel D. Procaccia,et al. Dynamic Social Choice with Evolving Preferences , 2013, AAAI.
[126] David Manlove,et al. Size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem , 2014, EC.
[127] E. Maskin,et al. The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility , 1979 .
[128] Alvin E. Roth,et al. Strategy-Proofness Versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the New York City High School Match , 2009 .
[129] Yeon-Koo Che,et al. Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms , 2008 .
[130] Jie Zhang,et al. Social Welfare in One-Sided Matchings: Random Priority and Beyond , 2014, SAGT.
[131] John William Hatfield,et al. Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations , 2009, Soc. Choice Welf..
[132] Daniel Monte,et al. Dynamic Matching Markets and the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism , 2015 .
[133] M. Pycia,et al. Ordinal Efficiency, Fairness, and Incentives in Large Markets , 2016 .
[134] Daniel Monte,et al. The Day Care Assignment: A Dynamic Matching Problem , 2014 .
[135] Parag A. Pathak,et al. Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism , 2006 .
[136] S. Pápai,et al. Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange , 2000 .
[137] H. Moulin. On strategy-proofness and single peakedness , 1980 .
[138] Sven Seuken,et al. Hybrid Mechanisms: Trading off Efficiency and Strategyproofness in One-Sided Matching , 2014 .
[139] Timo Mennle. Partial Strategyproofness : An Axiomatic Approach to Relaxing Strategyproofness for Assignment Mechanisms , 2015 .
[140] A. Tversky,et al. Contingent weighting in judgment and choice , 1988 .
[141] Kate Larson,et al. Random Serial Dictatorship versus Probabilistic Serial Rule: A Tale of Two Random Mechanisms , 2015, ArXiv.