Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: the N-player case

We characterize belief-free equilibria in infinitely repeated games with incom- plete information with an arbitrary number of players and arbitrary information structures. This generalizes Horner and Lovo (2008), which restrict attention to the two-player case and to information structures that have a product structure. Our characterization requires introducing a new type of individual rational constraint that links the lowest possible equilibrium payoffs across players. As in the two- player case, our characterization is tight: we define a set of payoffs that contains all the belief-free equilibrium payoffs; conversely, any point in the interior of this set is a belief-free equilibrium payoff vector when players are sufficiently patient.

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