and Teamwork: An Experimental Test

We use a laboratory experiment to study how perceptions of skill inuence teamwork. Our design is based on Gervais and Goldstein (2007) theory of teams. Team output is increasing in skill and in eort, skill and eort are complements, and workers’ eorts choices are complements. An overcondent

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