Intention recognition promotes the emergence of cooperation

Few problems have created the combined interest of so many unrelated areas as the evolution of cooperation. As a result, several mechanisms have been identified to work as catalyzers of cooperative behavior. Yet, these studies, mostly grounded on evolutionary dynamics and game theory, have neglected the important role played by intention recognition in behavioral evolution. Here we address explicitly this issue, characterizing the dynamics emerging from a population of intention recognizers. We derive a Bayesian network model for intention recognition in the context of repeated social dilemmas and evolutionary game theory, by assessing the internal dynamics of trust between intention recognizers and their opponents. Intention recognizers are then able to predict the next move of their opponents based on past direct interactions, which, in turn, enables them to prevail over the most famous strategies of repeated dilemmas of cooperation, even in presence of noise. Overall, our framework offers new insights on the complexity and beauty of behavioral evolution driven by elementary forms of cognition.

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