Game Theory Lecture Notes By

Given a coalitional game, the core may be empty or may be very large. This certainly causes difficulties in getting sharp predictions for the game. The Shapley value is a solution concept which is motivated by the need to have a solution concept that would predict a unique expected payoff allocation for every given coalitional game. The Shapley value concept was proposed using an axiomatic approach by Shapley in 1953, as a part of his doctoral dissertation at the Princeton University. Given a game ( ) ) i ,

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