Emergence of cooperation in the IPD game using spatial interactions

This paper presents a comparative study of two evolving populations, one in a non-spatial environment, and the other in a spatial environment, playing the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. The effect of the environment on the emergence of cooperation is studied. The populations are evolved using a genetic algorithm and the performance of the evolved individuals evaluated against expert and naive strategies. The spatial environment is shown to encourage the emergence of cooperation further than the non-spatial structure. We also demonstrate that a spatially evolved popuation is less resistant to incoming individuals, less exploitative in nature, and more able to be exploited than the strategies evolved in the nonspatial environment.

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