behavioural game theory

Analytical game theory assumes that players choose strategies which maximize the utility of game outcomes, based on their beliefs about what others players will do, given the economic structure of the game and history; in equilibrium, these beliefs are correct. Analytical game theory is enormously powerful, but it has two shortcomings as a complete model of behaviour by people (and other possible players, including non-human animals and organizations).

[1]  Gary E. Bolton,et al.  ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition , 2000 .

[2]  R. Selten,et al.  Experimental Sealed Bid First Price Auctions with Directly Observed Bid Functions , 1994 .

[3]  Miguel A. Costa-Gomes,et al.  Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study , 1998 .

[4]  R. McKelvey,et al.  Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games , 1998 .

[5]  M. Rabin,et al.  Understanding Social Preference with Simple Tests , 2001 .

[6]  Ernst Fehr,et al.  Testing Theories of Fairness - Intentions Matter , 2000, Games Econ. Behav..

[7]  M. Rabin.  Published by: American , 2022 .

[8]  David Dillenberger,et al.  Ashamed to be Selfish , 2008 .

[9]  I. Bohnet,et al.  Decomposing trust and trustworthiness , 2006 .

[10]  Robyn M. Dawes,et al.  What you don't know won't hurt me: Costly (but quiet) exit in dictator games , 2006 .

[11]  Charles A. Holt,et al.  Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory and Ten Intuitive Contradictions , 2001 .

[12]  V. Smith,et al.  Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games , 1994 .

[13]  Colin Camerer,et al.  “Economic man” in cross-cultural perspective: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies , 2005, Behavioral and Brain Sciences.

[14]  J. Brandts,et al.  IT'S WHAT YOU SAY, NOT WHAT YOU PAY: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF MANAGER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIPS IN OVERCOMING COORDINATION FAILURE , 2005 .

[15]  S. Blount.  When Social Outcomes Aren't Fair: The Effect of Causal Attributions on Preferences , 1995 .

[16]  Colin Camerer,et al.  Experience‐weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games , 1999 .

[17]  Colin Camerer,et al.  Iterated Dominance and Iterated Best-Response in Experimental P-Beauty Contests , 1998 .

[18]  R. McKelvey,et al.  Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games , 1995 .

[19]  Colin Camerer,et al.  A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games , 2004 .

[20]  Teck-Hua Ho,et al.  A learning-based model of repeated games with incomplete information , 2005, Games Econ. Behav..

[21]  S. Zamir,et al.  Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study , 1991 .

[22]  D. Stahl,et al.  On Players' Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence , 1995 .

[23]  Colin Camerer,et al.  When Does "Economic Man" Dominate Social Behavior? , 2006, Science.

[24]  Roberto A. Weber,et al.  Exploiting moral wiggle room: experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness , 2007 .

[25]  Dale O. Stahl,et al.  Rule Learning in Symmetric Normal-Form Games: Theory and Evidence , 2000, Games Econ. Behav..

[26]  R. Nagel.  Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study , 1995 .

[27]  J. Tirole,et al.  Incentives and Prosocial Behavior , 2004 .

[28]  Teck-Hua Ho,et al.  Self-tuning experience weighted attraction learning in games , 2007, J. Econ. Theory.

[29]  G. B. Pollock,et al.  SOCIAL ROLES AS AN EFFECTIVE LEARNING MECHANISM , 1999 .

[30]  Martin Dufwenberg,et al.  Measuring Beliefs in an Experimental Lost Wallet Game , 2000, Games Econ. Behav..

[31]  A. Roth,et al.  Simple reinforcement learning models and reciprocation in the prisoner's dilemma game. , 2001 .

[32]  E. Fehr.  A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation , 1998 .

[33]  R. Zeckhauser,et al.  Trust, Risk and Betrayal , 2003 .

[34]  Daniel Friedman,et al.  Individual Learning in Normal Form Games: Some Laboratory Results☆☆☆ , 1997 .