Game Theory Explorer: software for the applied game theorist

This paper presents the “Game Theory Explorer” software tool to create and analyze games as models of strategic interaction. A game in extensive or strategic form is created and nicely displayed with a graphical user interface in a web browser. State-of-the-art algorithms then compute all Nash equilibria of the game after a mouseclick. In tutorial fashion, we present how the program is used, and the ideas behind its main algorithms. We report on experiences with the architecture of the software and its development as an open-source project.

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