Factoring the human decision-making limitations in mobile crowdsensing

In this paper we address the way crowds of mobile end users are matched with crowdsensing (MCS) tasks. We challenge two practices/assumptions that are dominant in the related literature. The first one consists in approaching the problem as an instance of optimal centralized assignment of users to tasks. We argue instead that it is more plausible to view this as a task selection problem on the user side, i.e., users select tasks, and cast it as a multi-attribute decision problem with many alternatives. The second monotonously repeated assumption confronted in this paper is that end users, either when bidding for a specific task or in the few cases that themselves select tasks, behave as fully rational agents (strategically) seeking to make optimal choices. We rather explicitly acknowledge the bounded rationality of human decision making as this results from the human cognition processes and their inherent limitations. We first summarize long research threads on cognitive decision-making in the fields of economics and psychology and iterate on models(heuristics) that mobile end users possibly activate when selecting of crowdsensing tasks. Then, we describe what these heuristics imply for the end-user characterization (profiling) process and how their activation can be inferred out of past choices. Finally, we draw on empirical data collected through an online questionnaire to conduct a comparative study of different models for MCS task selection.

[1]  Peter C. Fishburn,et al.  LEXICOGRAPHIC ORDERS, UTILITIES AND DECISION RULES: A SURVEY , 1974 .

[2]  H. Simon,et al.  A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice , 1955 .

[3]  Jacob K. Goeree,et al.  Risk averse behavior in generalized matching pennies games , 2003, Games Econ. Behav..

[4]  Mor Naaman,et al.  The motivations and experiences of the on-demand mobile workforce , 2014, CSCW.

[5]  Mani Srivastava,et al.  Human-centric sensing , 2012, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences.

[6]  Daniel Friedman,et al.  Individual Learning in Normal Form Games: Some Laboratory Results☆☆☆ , 1997 .

[7]  Miguel A. Costa-Gomes,et al.  Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study , 1998 .

[8]  Alireza Sahami Shirazi,et al.  Location-based crowdsourcing: extending crowdsourcing to the real world , 2010, NordiCHI.

[9]  Colin Camerer,et al.  A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games , 2004 .

[10]  Laura Martignon,et al.  Naive and Yet Enlightened: From Natural Frequencies to Fast and Frugal Decision Trees , 2003 .

[11]  Colin Camerer,et al.  Experience‐weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games , 1999 .

[12]  A. Roth,et al.  Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria , 1998 .

[13]  R. McKelvey,et al.  Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games , 1995 .

[14]  R. Selten,et al.  Bounded rationality: The adaptive toolbox , 2000 .

[15]  R. Hertwig,et al.  The priority heuristic: making choices without trade-offs. , 2006, Psychological review.

[16]  G. Gigerenzer,et al.  One-reason decision-making: Modeling violations of expected utility theory , 2008 .

[17]  R. Luce Semiorders and a Theory of Utility Discrimination , 1956 .

[18]  Slegers,et al.  Probabilistic Mental Models with Continuous Predictors. , 2000, Organizational behavior and human decision processes.

[19]  Vaidy S. Sunderam,et al.  Spatial Task Assignment for Crowd Sensing with Cloaked Locations , 2014, 2014 IEEE 15th International Conference on Mobile Data Management.

[20]  J. Prashker,et al.  Violations of expected utility theory in route-choice behaviour , 2004 .

[21]  Samir Khuller,et al.  The Budgeted Maximum Coverage Problem , 1999, Inf. Process. Lett..

[22]  Miguel A. Costa-Gomes,et al.  Structural Models of Nonequilibrium Strategic Thinking: Theory, Evidence, and Applications , 2013 .

[23]  Robin M. Hogarth,et al.  Simple Models for Multiattribute Choice with Many Alternatives: When It Does and Does Not Pay to Face Trade-offs with Binary Attributes , 2005, Manag. Sci..

[24]  Iordanis Koutsopoulos,et al.  Optimal incentive-driven design of participatory sensing systems , 2013, 2013 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM.

[25]  Nathaniel T. Wilcox,et al.  Theories of Learning in Games and Heterogeneity Bias , 2006 .

[26]  Ugur Demiryurek,et al.  Maximizing the number of worker's self-selected tasks in spatial crowdsourcing , 2013, SIGSPATIAL/GIS.

[27]  Deborah Estrin,et al.  Recruitment Framework for Participatory Sensing Data Collections , 2010, Pervasive.

[28]  H. Simon,et al.  Rational choice and the structure of the environment. , 1956, Psychological review.

[29]  I. J. Myung,et al.  When a good fit can be bad , 2002, Trends in Cognitive Sciences.

[30]  Fan Ye,et al.  Mobile crowdsensing: current state and future challenges , 2011, IEEE Communications Magazine.

[31]  Jiming Chen,et al.  Toward optimal allocation of location dependent tasks in crowdsensing , 2014, IEEE INFOCOM 2014 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications.

[32]  A. Tversky,et al.  Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases , 1974, Science.

[33]  Konstantinos V. Katsikopoulos,et al.  Psychological Heuristics for Making Inferences: Definition, Performance, and the Emerging Theory and Practice , 2011, Decis. Anal..