Sponsored search auctions: an overview of research with emphasis on game theoretic aspects

We provide a broad overview of the research that has been conducted until recently on the design of sponsored search auctions. We mainly focus on game theoretic and mechanism design aspects of these auctions, and we analyze the issues associated with each of the three participating entities, i.e., the search engine, the advertisers, and the users of the search engine, as well as their resulting behavior. Regarding the search engine, we overview the various mechanisms that have been proposed including the currently used GSP mechanism. The issues that are addressed include analysis of Nash equilibria and their performance, design of alternative mechanisms and aspects of competition among search engines. We then move on to the advertisers and discuss the problem of choosing a bidding strategy, given the mechanism of the search engine. Following this, we consider the end users and we examine how user behavior may create externalities and influence the performance of the advertisers. Finally, we also overview statistical methods for estimating modeling parameters that are of interest to the three entities. In each section, we point out interesting open problems and directions for future research.

[1]  Roger B. Myerson,et al.  Optimal Auction Design , 1981, Math. Oper. Res..

[2]  Nicole Immorlica,et al.  Dynamics of bid optimization in online advertisement auctions , 2007, WWW '07.

[3]  Dajun Zeng,et al.  Budget-constrained bidding in the sponsored search , 2011, WITS 2011.

[4]  M. Dufwenberg Game theory. , 2011, Wiley interdisciplinary reviews. Cognitive science.

[5]  Tim Roughgarden,et al.  Equilibrium Efficiency and Price Complexity in Sponsored Search Auctions , 2010 .

[6]  Thorsten Joachims,et al.  Accurately interpreting clickthrough data as implicit feedback , 2005, SIGIR '05.

[7]  Qi Qi,et al.  Cooperative or Vindictive: Bidding Strategies in Sponsored Search Auction , 2007, WINE.

[8]  Nicole Immorlica,et al.  Externalities in Keyword Auctions: An Empirical and Theoretical Assessment , 2009, WINE.

[9]  K. Dembczynski Predicting Ads’ Click-Through Rate with Decision Rules , 2008 .

[10]  David M. Pennock,et al.  Revenue analysis of a family of ranking rules for keyword auctions , 2007, EC '07.

[11]  Itai Ashlagi,et al.  Competing Ad Auctions , 2013 .

[12]  Marcus Chi-hung Ling,et al.  Internet Advertising, Game Theory and Consumer Welfare , 2001, Electron. Commer. Res..

[13]  Arpita Ghosh,et al.  Expressive auctions for externalities in online advertising , 2010, WWW '10.

[14]  Tim Roughgarden,et al.  Welfare guarantees for combinatorial auctions with item bidding , 2011, SODA '11.

[15]  Kevin Leyton-Brown,et al.  Computational analysis of perfect-information position auctions , 2009, EC '09.

[16]  David C. Parkes,et al.  On Expressing Value Externalities in Position Auctions , 2011, AAAI.

[17]  Nick Craswell,et al.  An experimental comparison of click position-bias models , 2008, WSDM '08.

[18]  R. Preston McAfee,et al.  Value of Learning in Sponsored Search Auctions , 2010, WINE.

[19]  R. Ravi,et al.  Sort-Cut: A Pareto Optimal and Semi-Truthful Mechanism for Multi-Unit Auctions with Budget-Constrained Bidders , 2009, ArXiv.

[20]  E. David,et al.  Networks, Crowds, and Markets: Reasoning about a Highly Connected World , 2010 .

[21]  Benjamin P.-C. Yen,et al.  Migrating Procurement onto the Internet , 2002, Electron. Commer. Res..

[22]  Nicole Immorlica,et al.  Click Fraud Resistant Methods for Learning Click-Through Rates , 2005, WINE.

[23]  Ashish Goel,et al.  Truthful auctions for pricing search keywords , 2006, EC '06.

[24]  E. Stacchetti,et al.  How (not) to sell nuclear weapons , 1996 .

[25]  Q. Vuong,et al.  Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First-price Auctions , 2000 .

[26]  Michael Ostrovsky,et al.  Reserve Prices in Internet Advertising Auctions: A Field Experiment , 2009, Journal of Political Economy.

[27]  Xiaotie Deng,et al.  A New Ranking Scheme of the GSP Mechanism with Markovian Users , 2009, WINE.

[28]  Gagan Ghosh Multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders , 2012 .

[29]  Martin Shubik,et al.  The Assignment Game , 1971 .

[30]  Evangelos Markakis,et al.  Discrete Strategies in Keyword Auctions and Their Inefficiency for Locally Aware Bidders , 2010, WINE.

[31]  Sergei Vassilvitskii,et al.  Contract Auctions for Sponsored Search , 2009, WINE.

[32]  David C. Green Search Engine Marketing: Why it Benefits Us all , 2003 .

[33]  Piotr Krysta,et al.  Externalities among Advertisers in Sponsored Search , 2011, SAGT.

[34]  Yevgeniy Vorobeychik,et al.  Equilibrium analysis of dynamic bidding in sponsored search auctions , 2008, Int. J. Electron. Bus..

[35]  Jon Feldman,et al.  Budget optimization in search-based advertising auctions , 2006, EC '07.

[36]  R. Vohra,et al.  Algorithmic Game Theory: Sponsored Search Auctions , 2007 .

[37]  Mohammad Mahdian,et al.  A Cascade Model for Externalities in Sponsored Search , 2008, WINE.

[38]  Mohammad Mahdian,et al.  Externalities in online advertising , 2008, WWW.

[39]  I. Segal,et al.  What Makes Them Click: Empirical Analysis of Consumer Demand for Search Advertising , 2012 .

[40]  S. Muthukrishnan,et al.  Stochastic Models for Budget Optimization in Search-Based Advertising , 2006, Algorithmica.

[41]  Claire Mathieu,et al.  Greedy bidding strategies for keyword auctions , 2007, EC '07.

[42]  David Maxwell Chickering,et al.  The Pollution Effect: Optimizing Keyword Auctions by Favoring Relevant Advertising , 2011, ArXiv.

[43]  Moshe Tennenholtz,et al.  Position Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniqueness , 2010 .

[44]  Artyom Shneyerov,et al.  Quantile-Based Nonparametric Inference for First-Price Auctions , 2009 .

[45]  Jon Feldman,et al.  Sponsored Search Auctions with Markovian Users , 2008, WINE.

[46]  Xiaotie Deng,et al.  Forward looking Nash equilibrium for keyword auction , 2008, Inf. Process. Lett..

[47]  Benjamin Edelman,et al.  Strategic bidder behavior in sponsored search auctions , 2007, Decis. Support Syst..

[48]  Sarah Spiekermann,et al.  Motivating Human–Agent Interaction: Transferring Insights from Behavioral Marketing to Interface Design , 2002, Electron. Commer. Res..

[49]  Artyom Shneyerov,et al.  Supplement to 'Quantile-Based Nonparametric Inference for First-Price Auctions' , 2009 .

[50]  Yunhong Zhou,et al.  Vindictive bidding in keyword auctions , 2007, ICEC.

[51]  Vahab S. Mirrokni,et al.  Sink equilibria and convergence , 2005, 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS'05).

[52]  Aranyak Mehta,et al.  AdWords and Generalized On-line Matching , 2005, FOCS.

[53]  Renato Paes Leme,et al.  GSP auctions with correlated types , 2011, EC '11.

[54]  Anna R. Karlin,et al.  On the Equilibria and Efficiency of the GSP Mechanism in Keyword Auctions with Externalities , 2008, WINE.

[55]  Kamesh Munagala,et al.  Hybrid keyword search auctions , 2008, WWW '09.

[56]  H. Peyton Young,et al.  Strategic Learning and Its Limits , 2004 .

[57]  D. Gale,et al.  Multi-Item Auctions , 1986, Journal of Political Economy.

[58]  Peter Stone,et al.  Adaptive mechanism design: a metalearning approach , 2006, ICEC '06.

[59]  Glenn Ellison,et al.  Position Auctions with Consumer Search , 2007 .

[60]  Dawid Weiss,et al.  Predicting Ads' Click-Through Rate with Decision Rules , 2008 .

[61]  Gábor Lugosi,et al.  Prediction, learning, and games , 2006 .

[62]  Rica Gonen Characterizing Optimal Syndicated Sponsored Search Market Design Rica Gonen , 2009 .

[63]  Yukihiko Funaki,et al.  Theoretical and experimental investigations of the performance of keyword auction mechanisms , 2013 .

[64]  Hemant K. Bhargava,et al.  Implementing Sponsored Search in Web Search Engines: Computational Evaluation of Alternative Mechanisms , 2007, INFORMS J. Comput..

[65]  Gerhard Weiß,et al.  Antisocial Agents and Vickrey Auctions , 2001, ATAL.

[66]  E. H. Clarke Multipart pricing of public goods , 1971 .

[67]  E. Stacchetti,et al.  Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities , 1999 .

[68]  Theodore Groves,et al.  Incentives in Teams , 1973 .

[69]  Charles L. A. Clarke,et al.  Classifying and Characterizing Query Intent , 2009, ECIR.

[70]  Maurizio Naldi,et al.  Penalized Second Price: A New Pricing Algorithm for Advertising in Search Engines , 2010, 2010 8th Annual Communication Networks and Services Research Conference.

[71]  H. Leonard Elicitation of Honest Preferences for the Assignment of Individuals to Positions , 1983, Journal of Political Economy.

[72]  Charles L. A. Clarke,et al.  Characterizing commercial intent , 2009, CIKM.

[73]  Christos H. Papadimitriou,et al.  Worst-case equilibria , 1999 .

[74]  Sébastien Lahaie,et al.  An analysis of alternative slot auction designs for sponsored search , 2006, EC '06.

[75]  Moshe Tennenholtz,et al.  User modeling in position auctions: re-considering the GSP and VCG mechanisms , 2009, AAMAS.

[76]  Christine Chung,et al.  Stochastic Stability in Internet Router Congestion Games , 2009, SAGT.

[77]  Matthew Richardson,et al.  Predicting clicks: estimating the click-through rate for new ads , 2007, WWW '07.

[78]  Renato Paes Leme,et al.  On the efficiency of equilibria in generalized second price auctions , 2011, EC '11.

[79]  Thorsten Joachims,et al.  Accurately Interpreting Clickthrough Data as Implicit Feedback , 2017 .

[80]  L. Shapley,et al.  The assignment game I: The core , 1971 .

[81]  R. McAfee,et al.  Auctions and Bidding , 1986 .

[82]  Deeparnab Chakrabarty,et al.  Budget constrained bidding in keyword auctions and online knapsack problems , 2008, WINE.

[83]  Itai Ashlagi,et al.  Simultaneous Ad Auctions , 2011, Math. Oper. Res..

[84]  William Vickrey,et al.  Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders , 1961 .

[85]  Giuseppe D'Acquisto,et al.  The value of location in keyword auctions , 2010, Electron. Commer. Res. Appl..

[86]  C. D. Kemp,et al.  Density Estimation for Statistics and Data Analysis , 1987 .

[87]  Renato Paes Leme,et al.  Pure and Bayes-Nash Price of Anarchy for Generalized Second Price Auction , 2010, 2010 IEEE 51st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science.

[88]  Maurizio Naldi,et al.  The Competitor Busting Strategy in Keyword Auctions: Who's Worst Hit? , 2011, 2011 Ninth Annual Communication Networks and Services Research Conference.