Preventing Illegal Logging: Simultaneous Optimization of Resource Teams and Tactics for Security

Green security – protection of forests, fish and wildlife – is a critical problem in environmental sustainability. We focus on the problem of optimizing the defense of forests against illegal logging, where often we are faced with the challenge of teaming up many different groups, from national police to forest guards to NGOs, each with differing capabilities and costs. This paper introduces a new, yet fundamental problem: Simultaneous Optimization of Resource Teams and Tactics (SORT). SORT contrasts with most previous game-theoretic research for green security – in particular based on security games – that has solely focused on optimizing patrolling tactics, without consideration of team formation or coordination. We develop new models and scalable algorithms to apply SORT towards illegal logging in large forest areas. We evaluate our methods on a variety of synthetic examples, as well as a real-world case study using data from our on-going collaboration in Madagascar.

[1]  Gregory P. Asner,et al.  Mapping Recent Deforestation and Forest Disturbance in Northeastern Madagascar , 2013 .

[2]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Security scheduling for real-world networks , 2013, AAMAS.

[3]  Milind Tambe,et al.  Security and Game Theory - Algorithms, Deployed Systems, Lessons Learned , 2011 .

[4]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Complexity of Computing Optimal Stackelberg Strategies in Security Resource Allocation Games , 2010, AAAI.

[5]  Milind Tambe,et al.  When Security Games Go Green: Designing Defender Strategies to Prevent Poaching and Illegal Fishing , 2015, IJCAI.

[6]  D. Khasa,et al.  Issues and challenges of forest governance in Madagascar , 2015 .

[7]  David Eppstein,et al.  Studying (non-planar) road networks through an algorithmic lens , 2008, GIS '08.

[8]  Ananthram Swami,et al.  Multi-Objective Optimization for Trustworthy Tactical Networks: A Survey and Insights , 2013 .

[9]  Noa Agmon,et al.  Making the Most of Our Regrets: Regret-Based Solutions to Handle Payoff Uncertainty and Elicitation in Green Security Games , 2015, GameSec.

[10]  Steven Okamoto,et al.  Solving non-zero sum multiagent network flow security games with attack costs , 2012, AAMAS.

[11]  Milind Tambe,et al.  The Deployment-to-Saturation Ratio in Security Games , 2012, AAAI.

[12]  Marie desJardins,et al.  Agent-organized networks for dynamic team formation , 2005, AAMAS '05.

[13]  Milind Tambe,et al.  Patrol Strategies to Maximize Pristine Forest Area , 2012, AAAI.

[14]  Avrim Blum,et al.  Planning in the Presence of Cost Functions Controlled by an Adversary , 2003, ICML.

[15]  Takeshi Ito,et al.  Consultation Algorithm for Computer Shogi: Move Decisions by Majority , 2010, Computers and Games.

[16]  Sarvapali D. Ramchurn,et al.  Competing with Humans at Fantasy Football: Team Formation in Large Partially-Observable Domains , 2012, AAAI.

[17]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  A double oracle algorithm for zero-sum security games on graphs , 2011, AAMAS.