On Six Advances in Cooperation Theory

Abstract The symposium included in this issue of Analyse & Kritik extends the basis of Cooperation Theory as set forth in Axelrod’s Evolution of Cooperation (1984). This essay begins with an overview of Cooperation Theory in terms of the questions it asks, its relationship to game theory and rationality, and the principal methodologies used, namely deduction and simulation. This essay then addresses the issues raised in the symposium, including the consequences of extending the original paradigm of the two person iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma to take into account such factors as nonsimultaneous play, the ability to offer hostages for performance, social networks of interaction, information sharing that can support reputations, learning behavior, envy, misunderstanding, and an option to exit. The essay places the contributions of this symposium in the context of previous research on these and related issues.

[1]  C S Howe.  EXECUTIVE PROCEEDINGS: REPORT OF THE GENERAL SECRETARY. , 1905, Science.

[2]  S. Fiske,et al.  The Handbook of Social Psychology , 1935 .

[3]  Frederick Mosteller,et al.  Stochastic Models for Learning , 1956 .

[4]  T. Schelling.  The Strategy of Conflict , 1963 .

[5]  W. Hamilton.  The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I. , 1964, Journal of theoretical biology.

[6]  A. Rapoport,et al.  Prisoner's Dilemma , 1965 .

[7]  Brian Crane,et al.  Arms and Influence , 1966 .

[8]  Bernard Berelson,et al.  Human behavior: An inventory of scientific findings. , 1967 .

[9]  Helmut Schoeck,et al.  Envy: a theory of social behaviour , 1969 .

[10]  R. Trivers.  The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism , 1971, The Quarterly Review of Biology.

[11]  J. Friedman.  A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames , 1971 .

[12]  Graham Allison,et al.  Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis , 1972 .

[13]  O. Holsti,et al.  Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis , 1972 .

[14]  C. Packer.  Reciprocal altruism in Papio anubis , 1977, Nature.

[15]  T. Schelling.  Micromotives and Macrobehavior , 1978 .

[16]  J. March.  Bounded rationality, ambiguity, and the engineering of choice , 1978 .

[17]  W. Hamilton,et al.  The evolution of cooperation. , 1984, Science.

[18]  R. Axelrod.  The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists , 1981, American Political Science Review.

[19]  H. Simon,et al.  Models of Bounded Rationality: Empirically Grounded Economic Reason , 1997 .

[20]  W. Hamilton,et al.  The Evolution of Cooperation , 1984 .

[21]  P. Molander.  The Optimal Level of Generosity in a Selfish, Uncertain Environment , 1985 .

[22]  R. Axelrod,et al.  The Further Evolution of Cooperation , 1988, Science.

[23]  R. Frank.  Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions , 1990 .

[24]  H. Dewey.  Russia's Debt to the Mongols in Suretyship and Collective Responsibility , 1988, Comparative Studies in Society and History.

[25]  G. B. Pollock.  Evolutionary stability of reciprocity in a viscous lattice , 1989 .

[26]  W. Waller.  Passion Within Reason: The Strategic Role of Emotions , 1989 .

[27]  D. Hirshleifer,et al.  COOPERATION IN A REPEATED PRISONERS' DILEMMA WITH OSTRACISM , 1989 .

[28]  R. Schuessler.  Exit Threats and Cooperation under Anonymity , 1989 .

[29]  M. Schlossberg.  Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions. , 1990 .

[30]  H. Simon,et al.  A mechanism for social selection and successful altruism. , 1990, Science.

[31]  Bruce G. Linster.  Evolutionary Stability in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma Played by Two-State Moore Machines , 1992 .

[32]  L. Samuelson,et al.  Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata , 1992 .

[33]  M. Nowak,et al.  Evolutionary games and spatial chaos , 1992, Nature.

[34]  Kristian Lindgren,et al.  Evolutionary phenomena in simple dynamics , 1992 .

[35]  D. Page.  Theory of learning , 1993 .

[36]  M A Nowak,et al.  Spatial games and the maintenance of cooperation. , 1994, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America.

[37]  Marcus Frean.  The prisoner’s dilemma without synchrony , 1994, Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences.

[38]  M. Nowak,et al.  The Alternating Prisoner's Dilemma , 1994 .

[39]  K. Lindgren,et al.  Evolutionary dynamics of spatial games , 1994 .

[40]  R. Axelrod,et al.  How to Cope with Noise in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma , 1995 .

[41]  P. Grim.  The greater generosity of the spatialized prisoner’s dilemma , 1995 .

[42]  Steffen Huck,et al.  The Indirect Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Fair Allocations , 1999 .

[43]  Mark D. Smucker,et al.  Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Choice and Refusal of Partners: Evolutionary Results , 1995, ECAL.

[44]  Robert L. Axtell,et al.  Aligning simulation models: A case study and results , 1996, Comput. Math. Organ. Theory.

[45]  L. Tesfatsion,et al.  Preferential partner selection in an evolutionary study of Prisoner's Dilemma. , 1994, Bio Systems.

[46]  Bjorn Lomborg,et al.  Nucleus and shield : the evolution of social structure in the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma , 1996 .

[47]  M N,et al.  The Evolution of Cooperation in a Lattice-Structured Population , 1996 .

[48]  M. Milinski,et al.  Human cooperation in the simultaneous and the alternating Prisoner's Dilemma: Pavlov versus Generous Tit-for-Tat. , 1996, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America.

[49]  Y. Iwasa,et al.  The evolution of cooperation in a lattice-structured population. , 1997, Journal of theoretical biology.

[50]  Jonathan Bendor,et al.  The Evolutionary Stability of Cooperation , 1997, American Political Science Review.

[51]  Richard P. Larrick,et al.  The Claiming Effect: Why Players Are More Generous in Social Dilemmas Than in Ultimatum Games , 1997 .

[52]  M. N,et al.  The Logic of Contrition , 1997 .

[53]  O. Leimar.  Repeated Games: A State Space Approach , 1997 .

[54]  L. Samuelson.  Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection , 1997 .

[55]  Robert Axelrod.  Advancing the art of simulation in the social sciences , 1997 .

[56]  Josef Hofbauer,et al.  Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics , 1998 .

[57]  Joshua M. Epstein,et al.  Zones of cooperation in demographic prisoner's dilemma , 1997, Complex..

[58]  H. Peyton Young,et al.  Individual Strategy and Social Structure , 2020 .

[59]  Andrew M. Colman,et al.  The complexity of cooperation: Agent-based models of competition and collaboration , 1998, Complex..

[60]  G. Roberts,et al.  The evolution of generosity and choosiness in cooperative exchanges. , 1998, Journal of theoretical biology.

[61]  M A Nowak,et al.  The dynamics of indirect reciprocity. , 1998, Journal of theoretical biology.

[62]  M. Macy,et al.  The evolution of trust and cooperation between strangers: A computational model. , 1998 .

[63]  Hauert,et al.  Extending the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma without Synchrony. , 1998, Journal of theoretical biology.

[64]  Joshua M. Epstein,et al.  Zones of cooperation in demographic prisoner's dilemma , 1997, Complex.

[65]  M. Nowak,et al.  Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring , 1998, Nature.

[66]  D. Fudenberg,et al.  The Theory of Learning in Games , 1998 .

[67]  D. Buss.  Evolutionary Psychology -- The New Science of the Mind , 1998 .

[68]  H. Young,et al.  Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions , 1999 .

[69]  Martin A. Nowak,et al.  Phage-lift for game theory , 1999, Nature.

[70]  Paul E. Turner,et al.  Prisoner's dilemma in an RNA virus , 1999, Nature.

[71]  Michael X Cohen,et al.  The Emergence of Social Organization in the Prisoner's Dilemma: How Context-Preservation and Other Factors Promote Cooperation , 1999 .

[72]  W. Raub,et al.  Cooperation via Hostages , 2000 .

[73]  Bernd Lahno.  In Defense of Moderate Envy , 2000 .

[74]  Oliver Kirchkamp.  Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions by H. Peyton Young , 2000, J. Artif. Soc. Soc. Simul..

[75]  Diane J. Reyniers,et al.  Generalised Reciprocity and Reputation in the Theory of Cooperation: A Framework , 2000 .

[76]  J. Weesie,et al.  Cooperation via Social Networks , 2000 .

[77]  EdK-Group,et al.  Exit, Anonymity and the Chances of Egoistical Cooperation , 2000 .

[78]  Robert Axelrod,et al.  The Evolution of Strategies in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma , 2001 .