Adversary Models Account for Imperfect Crime Data: Forecasting and Planning against Real-world Poachers

Poachers are engaged in extinction level wholesale slaughter, so it is critical to harness historical data for predicting poachers' behavior. However, in these domains, data collected about adversarial actions are remarkably imperfect, where reported negative instances of crime may be mislabeled or uncertain. Unfortunately, past attempts to develop predictive and prescriptive models to address this problem suffer from shortcomings from a modeling perspective as well as in the implementability of their techniques. Most notably these models i) neglect the uncertainty in crime data, leading to inaccurate and biased predictions of adversary behavior, ii) use coarse-grained crime analysis and iii) do not provide a convincing evaluation as they only look at a single protected area. Additionally, they iv) proposed time-consuming techniques which cannot be directly integrated into low resource outposts. In this innovative application paper, we (I) introduce iWare-E a novel imperfect-observation aWare Ensemble (iWare-E) technique\footnoteiWare-E is a predictive model integrated into Protection Assistant for Wildlife Security system (PAWS) developed at the University of Southern California, which is designed to handle the uncertainty in crime information efficiently. This approach leads to superior accuracy for adversary behavior prediction (up to 34% increase in AUC) compared to the previous state-of-the-art. We also demonstrate the country-wide efficiency of the models and are the first to (II) evaluate our adversary behavioral model across different protected areas in Uganda, i.e., Murchison Fall and Queen Elizabeth National Park, (totaling about 7500 square km) as well as (III) on fine-grained temporal resolutions. Lastly, (IV) we provide a scalable planning algorithm to design fine-grained patrol routes for the rangers, which achieves up to 150% improvement in number of predicted attacks detected.

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