Hustling in Repeated Zero-Sum Games with Imperfect Execution

We study repeated games in which players have imperfect execution skill and one player's true skill is not common knowledge. In these settings the possibility arises of a player "hustling", or pretending to have lower execution skill than they actually have. Focusing on repeated zero-sum games, we provide a hustle-proof strategy; this strategy maximizes a player's payoff, regardless of the true skill level of the other player.

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