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[1] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Solving Stackelberg games with uncertain observability , 2011, AAMAS.
[2] Vincent Conitzer,et al. A double oracle algorithm for zero-sum security games on graphs , 2011, AAMAS.
[3] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Expressive markets for donating to charities , 2011, Artif. Intell..
[4] Vincent Conitzer,et al. False-Name-Proofness in Social Networks , 2010, WINE.
[5] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Strategy-Proof Voting Rules over Multi-issue Domains with Restricted Preferences , 2010, WINE.
[6] Piotr Faliszewski,et al. AI's War on Manipulation: Are We Winning? , 2010, AI Mag..
[7] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Using Mechanism Design to Prevent False-Name Manipulations , 2010, AI Mag..
[8] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Computationally Feasible Automated Mechanism Design: General Approach and Case Studies , 2010, AAAI.
[9] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Stackelberg Voting Games: Computational Aspects and Paradoxes , 2010, AAAI.
[10] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Compilation Complexity of Common Voting Rules , 2010, AAAI.
[11] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Complexity of Computing Optimal Stackelberg Strategies in Security Resource Allocation Games , 2010, AAAI.
[12] Bernhard von Stengel,et al. Leadership games with convex strategy sets , 2010, Games Econ. Behav..
[13] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Computing optimal strategies to commit to in extensive-form games , 2010, EC '10.
[14] Vincent Conitzer,et al. A scheduling approach to coalitional manipulation , 2010, EC '10.
[15] Vincent Conitzer,et al. False-name-proofness with bid withdrawal , 2010, AAMAS.
[16] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Strategy-proof allocation of multiple items between two agents without payments or priors , 2010, AAMAS.
[17] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Worst-case efficiency ratio in false-name-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms , 2010, AAMAS.
[18] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Aggregating preferences in multi-issue domains by using maximum likelihood estimators , 2010, AAMAS.
[19] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Stackelberg vs. Nash in security games: interchangeability, equivalence, and uniqueness , 2010, AAMAS.
[20] Vincent Conitzer. Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting , 2010, Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence.
[21] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Making decisions based on the preferences of multiple agents , 2010, CACM.
[22] Edith Elkind,et al. Equilibria of plurality voting with abstentions , 2010, EC '10.
[23] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Prediction Mechanisms That Do Not Incentivize Undesirable Actions , 2009, WINE.
[24] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Competitive Repeated Allocation without Payments , 2009, WINE.
[25] Mikhail J. Atallah,et al. Algorithms and Theory of Computation Handbook , 2009, Chapman & Hall/CRC Applied Algorithms and Data Structures series.
[26] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Learning and Approximating the Optimal Strategy to Commit To , 2009, SAGT.
[27] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Coalition Structure Generation Utilizing Compact Characteristic Function Representations , 2009, CP.
[28] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions , 2009, Games Econ. Behav..
[29] Vincent Conitzer,et al. How hard is it to control sequential elections via the agenda , 2009, IJCAI 2009.
[30] Lirong Xia,et al. On a generalization of triangulated graphs for domains decomposition of CSPs , 2009, IJCAI.
[31] Ariel D. Procaccia,et al. Complexity of unweighted coalitional manipulation under some common voting rules , 2009, IJCAI 2009.
[32] Yann Chevaleyre,et al. Compiling the votes of a subelectorate , 2009, IJCAI 2009.
[33] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Multi-Step Multi-Sensor Hider-Seeker Games , 2009, IJCAI.
[34] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Finite Local Consistency Characterizes Generalized Scoring Rules , 2009, IJCAI.
[35] Moshe Tennenholtz,et al. Approximate mechanism design without money , 2009, EC '09.
[36] Victor Naroditskiy,et al. Destroy to save , 2009, EC '09.
[37] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Prediction Markets, Mechanism Design, and Cooperative Game Theory , 2009, UAI.
[38] Mike Paterson,et al. False name manipulations in weighted voting games: splitting, merging and annexation , 2009, AAMAS.
[39] Manish Jain,et al. Computing optimal randomized resource allocations for massive security games , 2009, AAMAS.
[40] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Turing Trade: A Hybrid of a Turing Test and a Prediction Market , 2009, AMMA.
[41] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Incentive compatible budget elicitation in multi-unit auctions , 2009, SODA '10.
[42] Sarit Kraus,et al. Using Game Theory for Los Angeles Airport Security , 2009, AI Mag..
[43] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Anonymity-Proof Voting Rules , 2008, WINE.
[44] Vincent Conitzer,et al. An "Ethical" Game-Theoretic Solution Concept for Two-Player Perfect-Information Games , 2008, WINE.
[45] Noam Nisan,et al. Elections Can be Manipulated Often , 2008, 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science.
[46] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Welfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms , 2008, WINE.
[47] Nir Ailon,et al. Aggregating inconsistent information: Ranking and clustering , 2008 .
[48] Vincent Conitzer,et al. A qualitative vickrey auction , 2008, EC '09.
[49] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Voting on Multiattribute Domains with Cyclic Preferential Dependencies , 2008, AAAI.
[50] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Optimal False-Name-Proof Voting Rules with Costly Voting , 2008, AAAI.
[51] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Determining Possible and Necessary Winners under Common Voting Rules Given Partial Orders , 2008, AAAI.
[52] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions with unit demand , 2008, EC '08.
[53] Vincent Conitzer,et al. A sufficient condition for voting rules to be frequently manipulable , 2008, EC '08.
[54] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability , 2008, EC '08.
[55] Vincent Conitzer,et al. New complexity results about Nash equilibria , 2008, Games Econ. Behav..
[56] Michael Kaminsky,et al. SybilGuard: defending against sybil attacks via social networks , 2008, TNET.
[57] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Undominated VCG redistribution mechanisms , 2008, AAMAS.
[58] Sarit Kraus,et al. Playing games for security: an efficient exact algorithm for solving Bayesian Stackelberg games , 2008, AAMAS.
[59] Edith Elkind,et al. Divide and conquer: false-name manipulations in weighted voting games , 2008, AAMAS.
[60] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Using a Memory Test to Limit a User to One Account , 2008, AMEC/TADA.
[61] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Strategic betting for competitive agents , 2008, AAMAS.
[62] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Anonymity-proof Shapley value: extending shapley value for coalitional games in open environments , 2008, AAMAS.
[63] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms , 2008, Artif. Intell..
[64] Feng Xiao,et al. SybilLimit: A Near-Optimal Social Network Defense against Sybil Attacks , 2008, 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (sp 2008).
[65] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Structure-based protein NMR assignments using native structural ensembles , 2008, Journal of biomolecular NMR.
[66] Mohammad Mahdian,et al. Charity auctions on social networks , 2008, SODA '08.
[67] Ariel D. Procaccia,et al. Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem , 2008, SODA '08.
[68] Kousha Etessami,et al. On the Complexity of Nash Equilibria and Other Fixed Points (Extended Abstract) , 2010, 48th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS'07).
[69] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Limited verification of identities to induce false-name-proofness , 2007, TARK '07.
[70] Amin Saberi,et al. Approximating nash equilibria using small-support strategies , 2007, EC '07.
[71] Yishay Mansour,et al. The communication complexity of uncoupled nash equilibrium procedures , 2007, STOC '07.
[72] Georg Gottlob,et al. On the complexity of combinatorial auctions: structured item graphs and hypertree decomposition , 2007, EC '07.
[73] Vincent Conitzer,et al. When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate? , 2007, J. ACM.
[74] Ariel D. Procaccia,et al. Average-case tractability of manipulation in voting via the fraction of manipulators , 2007, AAMAS '07.
[75] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Eliciting single-peaked preferences using comparison queries , 2007, AAMAS '07.
[76] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Incremental Mechanism Design , 2007, IJCAI.
[77] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Automated Design of Multistage Mechanisms , 2007, IJCAI.
[78] Aranyak Mehta,et al. A note on approximate Nash equilibria , 2006, Theor. Comput. Sci..
[79] Xiaotie Deng,et al. Settling the Complexity of Two-Player Nash Equilibrium , 2006, 2006 47th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS'06).
[80] Anders Yeo,et al. The Minimum Feedback Arc Set Problem is NP-Hard for Tournaments , 2006, Combinatorics, Probability and Computing.
[81] Phillip B. Gibbons,et al. SybilGuard: Defending Against Sybil Attacks via Social Networks , 2006, IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking.
[82] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Improved Bounds for Computing Kemeny Rankings , 2006, AAAI.
[83] Vincent Conitzer,et al. A Compact Representation Scheme for Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments , 2006, AAAI.
[84] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Nonexistence of Voting Rules That Are Usually Hard to Manipulate , 2006, AAAI.
[85] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Computing Slater Rankings Using Similarities among Candidates , 2006, AAAI.
[86] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Learning algorithms for online principal-agent problems (and selling goods online) , 2006, ICML.
[87] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Computing the optimal strategy to commit to , 2006, EC '06.
[88] Paul W. Goldberg,et al. The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium , 2006, STOC '06.
[89] Ruggiero Cavallo,et al. Optimal decision-making with minimal waste: strategyproof redistribution of VCG payments , 2006, AAMAS '06.
[90] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and exchanges , 2006, AAMAS '06.
[91] Vincent Conitzer,et al. A technique for reducing normal-form games to compute a Nash equilibrium , 2006, AAMAS '06.
[92] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions , 2006, Artif. Intell..
[93] Xi Chen,et al. Computing Nash Equilibria: Approximation and Smoothed Complexity , 2006, 2006 47th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS'06).
[94] Edith Hemaspaandra,et al. The complexity of Kemeny elections , 2005, Theor. Comput. Sci..
[95] Tuomas Sandholm,et al. Optimal Winner Determination Algorithms , 2005 .
[96] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Common Voting Rules as Maximum Likelihood Estimators , 2005, UAI.
[97] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Combinatorial Auctions with k-wise Dependent Valuations , 2005, AAAI.
[98] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Computational Aspects of Mechanism Design , 2005, AAAI.
[99] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Mixed-Integer Programming Methods for Finding Nash Equilibria , 2005, AAAI.
[100] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments , 2005, IJCAI.
[101] Vincent Conitzer,et al. A Generalized Strategy Eliminability Criterion and Computational Methods for Applying It , 2005, AAAI.
[102] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Complexity of (iterated) dominance , 2005, EC '05.
[103] Yoav Shoham,et al. Marginal contribution nets: a compact representation scheme for coalitional games , 2005, EC '05.
[104] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Communication complexity of common voting rules , 2005, EC '05.
[105] Lawrence M. Ausubel,et al. The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction , 2004 .
[106] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Computing Shapley Values, Manipulating Value Division Schemes, and Checking Core Membership in Multi-Issue Domains , 2004, AAAI.
[107] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Combinatorial Auctions with Structured Item Graphs , 2004, AAAI.
[108] Vincent Conitzer,et al. An algorithm for automatically designing deterministic mechanisms without payments , 2004, Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2004. AAMAS 2004..
[109] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Communication complexity as a lower bound for learning in games , 2004, ICML.
[110] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Towards a Characterization of Polynomial Preference Elicitation with Value Queries in Combinatorial Auctions (Extended Abstract) , 2004, COLT.
[111] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Computational criticisms of the revelation principle , 2004, EC '04.
[112] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions , 2004, EC '04.
[113] J. Wolfers,et al. Prediction Markets , 2003 .
[114] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Automated mechanism design: complexity results stemming from the single-agent setting , 2003, ICEC '03.
[115] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Definition and Complexity of Some Basic Metareasoning Problems , 2003, IJCAI.
[116] Inon Zuckerman,et al. Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard , 2003, IJCAI.
[117] Vincent Conitzer,et al. BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games , 2003, ICML.
[118] Vincent Conitzer,et al. AWESOME: A general multiagent learning algorithm that converges in self-play and learns a best response against stationary opponents , 2003, Machine Learning.
[119] Andrew Byde,et al. Applying evolutionary game theory to auction mechanism design , 2003, EEE International Conference on E-Commerce, 2003. CEC 2003..
[120] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Vote elicitation: complexity and strategy-proofness , 2002, AAAI/IAAI.
[121] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Complexity of Mechanism Design , 2002, UAI.
[122] Dave Cliff,et al. Evolution of market mechanism through a continuous space of auction-types , 2002, Proceedings of the 2002 Congress on Evolutionary Computation. CEC'02 (Cat. No.02TH8600).
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[124] John R. Douceur,et al. The Sybil Attack , 2002, IPTPS.
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[127] Craig Boutilier,et al. Bidding Languages for Combinatorial Auctions , 2001, IJCAI.
[128] Makoto Yokoo,et al. Robust Combinatorial Auction Protocol against False-Name Bids , 2000, AAAI/IAAI.
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[139] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Computing optimal outcomes under an expressive representation of settings with externalities , 2012, J. Comput. Syst. Sci..
[140] Milind Tambe,et al. Security and Game Theory: IRIS – A Tool for Strategic Security Allocation in Transportation Networks , 2011, AAMAS 2011.
[141] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Metareasoning as a Formal Computational Problem , 2011, Metareasoning.
[142] Hervé Moulin,et al. Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects , 2009, J. Econ. Theory.
[143] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Aggregating value ranges: preference elicitation and truthfulness , 2009, Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems.
[144] T. Sandholm,et al. The Cost and Windfall of Manipulability , 2008 .
[145] Michael P. Wellman,et al. Mechanism Design and Analysis Using Simulation-Based Game Models , 2008 .
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[148] Noga Alon,et al. Ranking Tournaments , 2006, SIAM J. Discret. Math..
[149] David C. Parkes,et al. Iterative Combinatorial Auctions , 2006 .
[150] Vincent Conitzer,et al. Computational aspects of preference aggregation , 2006 .
[151] Yann Chevaleyre,et al. Multiagent Resource Allocation with K -additive Utility Functions , 2004 .
[152] Makoto Yokoo,et al. The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions , 2004, Games Econ. Behav..
[153] Craig Boutilier,et al. CP-nets: a tool for represent-ing and reasoning with conditional ceteris paribus state-ments , 2004 .
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