Intellectual development statement

My research focuses on issues in the intersection of computer science (especially artificial intelligence and multiagent systems) and economics (especially microeconomic theory, game theory, social choice, and mechanism design). Each of these two disciplines can contribute significantly to the other. On the one hand, as computer systems become more interconnected, multiple parties must interact in the same environment and compete for scarce resources, which necessarily introduces economic phenomena. Here, economic theory can contribute to computer science—though the specific environments faced by computer scientists often require new contributions. On the other hand, in the past, deployed economic mechanisms (such as auctions and exchanges) have been designed to require very limited computing and communication resources, even though economic theory allows for much more powerful mechanisms in principle. Computer science can contribute to economics by allowing us to fully operationalize economic theory, resulting in more efficient as well as entirely novel mechanisms—though this requires the design of new algorithms as well as other contributions. I am devoted to exploring both of these directions. Most of my research can be placed in at least one of the following four categories. These categories do not separate cleanly. More detail on these topics is given later in this statement.

[1]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Solving Stackelberg games with uncertain observability , 2011, AAMAS.

[2]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  A double oracle algorithm for zero-sum security games on graphs , 2011, AAMAS.

[3]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Expressive markets for donating to charities , 2011, Artif. Intell..

[4]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  False-Name-Proofness in Social Networks , 2010, WINE.

[5]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Strategy-Proof Voting Rules over Multi-issue Domains with Restricted Preferences , 2010, WINE.

[6]  Piotr Faliszewski,et al.  AI's War on Manipulation: Are We Winning? , 2010, AI Mag..

[7]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Using Mechanism Design to Prevent False-Name Manipulations , 2010, AI Mag..

[8]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Computationally Feasible Automated Mechanism Design: General Approach and Case Studies , 2010, AAAI.

[9]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Stackelberg Voting Games: Computational Aspects and Paradoxes , 2010, AAAI.

[10]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Compilation Complexity of Common Voting Rules , 2010, AAAI.

[11]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Complexity of Computing Optimal Stackelberg Strategies in Security Resource Allocation Games , 2010, AAAI.

[12]  Bernhard von Stengel,et al.  Leadership games with convex strategy sets , 2010, Games Econ. Behav..

[13]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Computing optimal strategies to commit to in extensive-form games , 2010, EC '10.

[14]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  A scheduling approach to coalitional manipulation , 2010, EC '10.

[15]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  False-name-proofness with bid withdrawal , 2010, AAMAS.

[16]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Strategy-proof allocation of multiple items between two agents without payments or priors , 2010, AAMAS.

[17]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Worst-case efficiency ratio in false-name-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms , 2010, AAMAS.

[18]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Aggregating preferences in multi-issue domains by using maximum likelihood estimators , 2010, AAMAS.

[19]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Stackelberg vs. Nash in security games: interchangeability, equivalence, and uniqueness , 2010, AAMAS.

[20]  Vincent Conitzer Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting , 2010, Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence.

[21]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Making decisions based on the preferences of multiple agents , 2010, CACM.

[22]  Edith Elkind,et al.  Equilibria of plurality voting with abstentions , 2010, EC '10.

[23]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Prediction Mechanisms That Do Not Incentivize Undesirable Actions , 2009, WINE.

[24]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Competitive Repeated Allocation without Payments , 2009, WINE.

[25]  Mikhail J. Atallah,et al.  Algorithms and Theory of Computation Handbook , 2009, Chapman & Hall/CRC Applied Algorithms and Data Structures series.

[26]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Learning and Approximating the Optimal Strategy to Commit To , 2009, SAGT.

[27]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Coalition Structure Generation Utilizing Compact Characteristic Function Representations , 2009, CP.

[28]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions , 2009, Games Econ. Behav..

[29]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  How hard is it to control sequential elections via the agenda , 2009, IJCAI 2009.

[30]  Lirong Xia,et al.  On a generalization of triangulated graphs for domains decomposition of CSPs , 2009, IJCAI.

[31]  Ariel D. Procaccia,et al.  Complexity of unweighted coalitional manipulation under some common voting rules , 2009, IJCAI 2009.

[32]  Yann Chevaleyre,et al.  Compiling the votes of a subelectorate , 2009, IJCAI 2009.

[33]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Multi-Step Multi-Sensor Hider-Seeker Games , 2009, IJCAI.

[34]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Finite Local Consistency Characterizes Generalized Scoring Rules , 2009, IJCAI.

[35]  Moshe Tennenholtz,et al.  Approximate mechanism design without money , 2009, EC '09.

[36]  Victor Naroditskiy,et al.  Destroy to save , 2009, EC '09.

[37]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Prediction Markets, Mechanism Design, and Cooperative Game Theory , 2009, UAI.

[38]  Mike Paterson,et al.  False name manipulations in weighted voting games: splitting, merging and annexation , 2009, AAMAS.

[39]  Manish Jain,et al.  Computing optimal randomized resource allocations for massive security games , 2009, AAMAS.

[40]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Turing Trade: A Hybrid of a Turing Test and a Prediction Market , 2009, AMMA.

[41]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Incentive compatible budget elicitation in multi-unit auctions , 2009, SODA '10.

[42]  Sarit Kraus,et al.  Using Game Theory for Los Angeles Airport Security , 2009, AI Mag..

[43]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Anonymity-Proof Voting Rules , 2008, WINE.

[44]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  An "Ethical" Game-Theoretic Solution Concept for Two-Player Perfect-Information Games , 2008, WINE.

[45]  Noam Nisan,et al.  Elections Can be Manipulated Often , 2008, 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science.

[46]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Welfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms , 2008, WINE.

[47]  Nir Ailon,et al.  Aggregating inconsistent information: Ranking and clustering , 2008 .

[48]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  A qualitative vickrey auction , 2008, EC '09.

[49]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Voting on Multiattribute Domains with Cyclic Preferential Dependencies , 2008, AAAI.

[50]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Optimal False-Name-Proof Voting Rules with Costly Voting , 2008, AAAI.

[51]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Determining Possible and Necessary Winners under Common Voting Rules Given Partial Orders , 2008, AAAI.

[52]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions with unit demand , 2008, EC '08.

[53]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  A sufficient condition for voting rules to be frequently manipulable , 2008, EC '08.

[54]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability , 2008, EC '08.

[55]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  New complexity results about Nash equilibria , 2008, Games Econ. Behav..

[56]  Michael Kaminsky,et al.  SybilGuard: defending against sybil attacks via social networks , 2008, TNET.

[57]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Undominated VCG redistribution mechanisms , 2008, AAMAS.

[58]  Sarit Kraus,et al.  Playing games for security: an efficient exact algorithm for solving Bayesian Stackelberg games , 2008, AAMAS.

[59]  Edith Elkind,et al.  Divide and conquer: false-name manipulations in weighted voting games , 2008, AAMAS.

[60]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Using a Memory Test to Limit a User to One Account , 2008, AMEC/TADA.

[61]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Strategic betting for competitive agents , 2008, AAMAS.

[62]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Anonymity-proof Shapley value: extending shapley value for coalitional games in open environments , 2008, AAMAS.

[63]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms , 2008, Artif. Intell..

[64]  Feng Xiao,et al.  SybilLimit: A Near-Optimal Social Network Defense against Sybil Attacks , 2008, 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (sp 2008).

[65]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Structure-based protein NMR assignments using native structural ensembles , 2008, Journal of biomolecular NMR.

[66]  Mohammad Mahdian,et al.  Charity auctions on social networks , 2008, SODA '08.

[67]  Ariel D. Procaccia,et al.  Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem , 2008, SODA '08.

[68]  Kousha Etessami,et al.  On the Complexity of Nash Equilibria and Other Fixed Points (Extended Abstract) , 2010, 48th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS'07).

[69]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Limited verification of identities to induce false-name-proofness , 2007, TARK '07.

[70]  Amin Saberi,et al.  Approximating nash equilibria using small-support strategies , 2007, EC '07.

[71]  Yishay Mansour,et al.  The communication complexity of uncoupled nash equilibrium procedures , 2007, STOC '07.

[72]  Georg Gottlob,et al.  On the complexity of combinatorial auctions: structured item graphs and hypertree decomposition , 2007, EC '07.

[73]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate? , 2007, J. ACM.

[74]  Ariel D. Procaccia,et al.  Average-case tractability of manipulation in voting via the fraction of manipulators , 2007, AAMAS '07.

[75]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Eliciting single-peaked preferences using comparison queries , 2007, AAMAS '07.

[76]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Incremental Mechanism Design , 2007, IJCAI.

[77]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Automated Design of Multistage Mechanisms , 2007, IJCAI.

[78]  Aranyak Mehta,et al.  A note on approximate Nash equilibria , 2006, Theor. Comput. Sci..

[79]  Xiaotie Deng,et al.  Settling the Complexity of Two-Player Nash Equilibrium , 2006, 2006 47th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS'06).

[80]  Anders Yeo,et al.  The Minimum Feedback Arc Set Problem is NP-Hard for Tournaments , 2006, Combinatorics, Probability and Computing.

[81]  Phillip B. Gibbons,et al.  SybilGuard: Defending Against Sybil Attacks via Social Networks , 2006, IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking.

[82]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Improved Bounds for Computing Kemeny Rankings , 2006, AAAI.

[83]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  A Compact Representation Scheme for Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments , 2006, AAAI.

[84]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Nonexistence of Voting Rules That Are Usually Hard to Manipulate , 2006, AAAI.

[85]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Computing Slater Rankings Using Similarities among Candidates , 2006, AAAI.

[86]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Learning algorithms for online principal-agent problems (and selling goods online) , 2006, ICML.

[87]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Computing the optimal strategy to commit to , 2006, EC '06.

[88]  Paul W. Goldberg,et al.  The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium , 2006, STOC '06.

[89]  Ruggiero Cavallo,et al.  Optimal decision-making with minimal waste: strategyproof redistribution of VCG payments , 2006, AAMAS '06.

[90]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and exchanges , 2006, AAMAS '06.

[91]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  A technique for reducing normal-form games to compute a Nash equilibrium , 2006, AAMAS '06.

[92]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions , 2006, Artif. Intell..

[93]  Xi Chen,et al.  Computing Nash Equilibria: Approximation and Smoothed Complexity , 2006, 2006 47th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS'06).

[94]  Edith Hemaspaandra,et al.  The complexity of Kemeny elections , 2005, Theor. Comput. Sci..

[95]  Tuomas Sandholm,et al.  Optimal Winner Determination Algorithms , 2005 .

[96]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Common Voting Rules as Maximum Likelihood Estimators , 2005, UAI.

[97]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Combinatorial Auctions with k-wise Dependent Valuations , 2005, AAAI.

[98]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Computational Aspects of Mechanism Design , 2005, AAAI.

[99]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Mixed-Integer Programming Methods for Finding Nash Equilibria , 2005, AAAI.

[100]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments , 2005, IJCAI.

[101]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  A Generalized Strategy Eliminability Criterion and Computational Methods for Applying It , 2005, AAAI.

[102]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Complexity of (iterated) dominance , 2005, EC '05.

[103]  Yoav Shoham,et al.  Marginal contribution nets: a compact representation scheme for coalitional games , 2005, EC '05.

[104]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Communication complexity of common voting rules , 2005, EC '05.

[105]  Lawrence M. Ausubel,et al.  The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction , 2004 .

[106]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Computing Shapley Values, Manipulating Value Division Schemes, and Checking Core Membership in Multi-Issue Domains , 2004, AAAI.

[107]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Combinatorial Auctions with Structured Item Graphs , 2004, AAAI.

[108]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  An algorithm for automatically designing deterministic mechanisms without payments , 2004, Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2004. AAMAS 2004..

[109]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Communication complexity as a lower bound for learning in games , 2004, ICML.

[110]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Towards a Characterization of Polynomial Preference Elicitation with Value Queries in Combinatorial Auctions (Extended Abstract) , 2004, COLT.

[111]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Computational criticisms of the revelation principle , 2004, EC '04.

[112]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions , 2004, EC '04.

[113]  J. Wolfers,et al.  Prediction Markets , 2003 .

[114]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Automated mechanism design: complexity results stemming from the single-agent setting , 2003, ICEC '03.

[115]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Definition and Complexity of Some Basic Metareasoning Problems , 2003, IJCAI.

[116]  Inon Zuckerman,et al.  Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard , 2003, IJCAI.

[117]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games , 2003, ICML.

[118]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  AWESOME: A general multiagent learning algorithm that converges in self-play and learns a best response against stationary opponents , 2003, Machine Learning.

[119]  Andrew Byde,et al.  Applying evolutionary game theory to auction mechanism design , 2003, EEE International Conference on E-Commerce, 2003. CEC 2003..

[120]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Vote elicitation: complexity and strategy-proofness , 2002, AAAI/IAAI.

[121]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Complexity of Mechanism Design , 2002, UAI.

[122]  Dave Cliff,et al.  Evolution of market mechanism through a continuous space of auction-types , 2002, Proceedings of the 2002 Congress on Evolutionary Computation. CEC'02 (Cat. No.02TH8600).

[123]  Manuela M. Veloso,et al.  Multiagent learning using a variable learning rate , 2002, Artif. Intell..

[124]  John R. Douceur,et al.  The Sybil Attack , 2002, IPTPS.

[125]  Tuomas Sandholm,et al.  Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions , 2001, AAMAS '02.

[126]  Moshe Tennenholtz,et al.  Fair imposition , 2001, J. Econ. Theory.

[127]  Craig Boutilier,et al.  Bidding Languages for Combinatorial Auctions , 2001, IJCAI.

[128]  Makoto Yokoo,et al.  Robust Combinatorial Auction Protocol against False-Name Bids , 2000, AAAI/IAAI.

[129]  Yishay Mansour,et al.  Nash Convergence of Gradient Dynamics in General-Sum Games , 2000, UAI.

[130]  S. Brams,et al.  The paradox of multiple elections , 1998 .

[131]  M. Bailey The demand revealing process: To distribute the surplus , 1997 .

[132]  Eitan Zemel,et al.  The Complexity of Eliminating Dominated Strategies , 1993, Math. Oper. Res..

[133]  Carsten Thomassen,et al.  A Polynomial Algorithm for the 2-Path Problem for Semicomplete Digraphs , 1992, SIAM J. Discret. Math..

[134]  M. Trick,et al.  The computational difficulty of manipulating an election , 1989 .

[135]  M. Trick,et al.  Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election , 1989 .

[136]  Eitan Zemel,et al.  Nash and correlated equilibria: Some complexity considerations , 1989 .

[137]  H. Young,et al.  A Consistent Extension of Condorcet’s Election Principle , 1978 .

[138]  A. M. Turing,et al.  Computing Machinery and Intelligence , 1950, The Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence.

[139]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Computing optimal outcomes under an expressive representation of settings with externalities , 2012, J. Comput. Syst. Sci..

[140]  Milind Tambe,et al.  Security and Game Theory: IRIS – A Tool for Strategic Security Allocation in Transportation Networks , 2011, AAMAS 2011.

[141]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Metareasoning as a Formal Computational Problem , 2011, Metareasoning.

[142]  Hervé Moulin,et al.  Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects , 2009, J. Econ. Theory.

[143]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Aggregating value ranges: preference elicitation and truthfulness , 2009, Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems.

[144]  T. Sandholm,et al.  The Cost and Windfall of Manipulability , 2008 .

[145]  Michael P. Wellman,et al.  Mechanism Design and Analysis Using Simulation-Based Game Models , 2008 .

[146]  Radu Jurca,et al.  TRUTHFUL REPUTATION MECHANISMS FOR ONLINE SYSTEMS , 2007 .

[147]  Michel Gendreau,et al.  Combinatorial auctions , 2007, Ann. Oper. Res..

[148]  Noga Alon,et al.  Ranking Tournaments , 2006, SIAM J. Discret. Math..

[149]  David C. Parkes,et al.  Iterative Combinatorial Auctions , 2006 .

[150]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Computational aspects of preference aggregation , 2006 .

[151]  Yann Chevaleyre,et al.  Multiagent Resource Allocation with K -additive Utility Functions , 2004 .

[152]  Makoto Yokoo,et al.  The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions , 2004, Games Econ. Behav..

[153]  Craig Boutilier,et al.  CP-nets: a tool for represent-ing and reasoning with conditional ceteris paribus state-ments , 2004 .

[154]  T. Sandholm,et al.  Applications of Automated Mechanism Design , 2003 .

[155]  D. Lehmann,et al.  The Winner Determination Problem , 2003 .

[156]  O. H. Brownlee,et al.  ACTIVITY ANALYSIS OF PRODUCTION AND ALLOCATION , 1952 .